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Following the US Supreme Court's endorsement of the
promotion of consumer welfare as the single goal of antitrust and
intellectual property laws, many courts have reasserted their
commitment o the market access doctrine for antitrust and intellectual
property law liability. These courts have rejected the Court's
submission in GTE Sylvania to adhere to a strict output/profitability
test concentrating predominantly on the positive and negative welfare
effects regarding allegedly infringing conduct. This Article examines
several important antitrust and intellectual property law decisions and
locates within them a common flaw to express an intelligible, distinct
doctrinal function for giving precedence to market access, despite the
courts' implied ambition to do so. Courts following the market access
framework rightly intuit that the conventional output/profitability test
offers an inadequate foundation for assessing innovation or the
promotion of progress in antitrust and intellectual property law cases.
The contentious alternative approach of providing market actors with
equal economic opportunities to participate in the competitive process
that courts have proposed as a substitute, however, merely provides a
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formless and ill-justified doctrinal construction that frequently appears
to coincide with the very same output/profitability framework it claims
to discard. This Article seeks to transcend these deficiencies of the
market access doctrine by finding a conceptually separate, normatively
appealing function for the doctrine to be utilized within antitrust and
intellectual property law: the market access doctrine should be based
on important insights from cognitive psychological research with
respect to the ways in which ordinary consumers evaluate innovation
and progress.
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Both antitrust and intellectual property laws protect markets
in order to maintain and, where necessary, restore competition. To
fulfill this role, theorists offer several economic and social goals that
serve to define and limit the contractual and intellectual property
rights that incentivize competition and innovation. Scholars have
argued that these goals include the protection of the market
mechanism as such to allocate resources among market actors and
consumers.' Others have expressed concern with protecting particular
non-consumer interest groups such as small firms or individual
competitors.2 Still others have held that the preservation of economic
efficiency was the sole guiding concern of those who drafted the
Sherman Act and the Progress Clause.
3  Assuming a universal
agreement on one single goal-the promotion of an efficient allocation
of society's available goods and services-academics would still
disagree on whether this aim is best achieved through the prevention
of wealth transfers to participants with market power, the
preservation of consumer choice, the promotion of technological
progress, or the maintenance of decentralized economic control.
4
Commentators who disagree with the idea that markets should
be regulated solely to. maintain allocative efficiency have proposed an
alternative standard: the protection of equal economic opportunities to
compete. That is, to the extent that monopolistic conduct significantly
inhibits the ability of rivals to engage in fair competition, and where
circumstances suggest that courts cannot practically determine if
allocative efficiency is increased, courts should give market actors a
meaningful chance to compete with incumbent actors.5 This doctrine,
however, has become the antitrust and intellectual property law
1. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 7 (1966).
2. WILLIAM F. SHUGHART, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 11-12
(1990); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985); see also
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67-68 (1982).
3. See Lande, supra note 2, at 68.
4. See Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988).
5. Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property Concept, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 1369, 1420 (2006); Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary
Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Stephen F. Ross, Network Economic Effects
and the Limits of GTE Sylvania's Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 945 (2000).
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version of unfair competition law's prohibition against price
discrimination contained within the Robinson-Patman Act6-a
doctrine almost unanimously scorned but inscrutably persistent.7
Purporting to emanate from the basic notion of liberty and pursuit of
happiness at the heart of American political culture8 and its
"long-cherished" American ideal of equal opportunity-the ability of
an individual to choose to be an entrepreneur ather than an employee
without her options being restricted by unnecessary barriers to entry
or exclusionary practice9-the doctrine actually seems to be a
grotesque misinterpretation of the Sherman Act and the
Constitution's Progress Clause.10 As most commentators criticize, the
market access doctrine rose to fame during the activist period of
antitrust enforcement that lasted into the 1960s.11  Even at the
doctrine's peak success, commentators articulated opposition to its
attempt to rest legal market regulatory paradigms on the simple, but
fundamentally unstructured, determination of whether a business
practice violated the competitive process in this way. 12
Indeed, by the 1980s, a consensus view materialized that the
market access doctrine was both unjustifiable in theory and unusable
in practice.13  In its place, scholars favored the perspicuous
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012); see, e.g., Mark A. Glick, David G. Mangum & Lara A.
Swensen, Towards a More Reasoned Application of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Holistic View
Incorporating Principles of Law and Economics in Light of Congressional Intent, 60 ANTITRUST
BULL. 279 (2015); John B. Kirkwood, Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve Consumers
and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 358 (2015).
7. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE xv-xxiii, 17, 30-50 (2013); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from - Where Are We Going, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means
and Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265 (1993); Ross, supra note 5, at 945.
8. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 1 (1955).
9. Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377,
384 (1965).
10. The Sherman Antitrust Act's provisions are laid down in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
The Progress Clause is contained within Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As the US Supreme Court recognized, "[t]he economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
11. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). But see
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
12. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).




cost-benefit balancing method of the basic alternate doctrine that
economists at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and later had
developed for determining the workings and dysfunctions of the
market system, the output/profitability test.14 Ultimately, as antitrust
law entered its ninth decade of confusion regarding the choice and
meaning of its goals, Robert Bork published a much acclaimed account
of an argument produced by Aaron Director and other economists from
the University of Chicago. This account supported the political
authority of "consumer welfare" as the only legitimate objective of the
laws that regulate the conduct and organization of business
corporations and that establish and enforce the rules of a competitive
marketplace.15 The crucial passage in Bork's influential book, The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, sent echoes and
reverberations through later interpretations of antitrust laws
and-although Bork never made an effort to extend its scope to other
areas of the law-reached its pinnacle of recognition in the ways
academics and practitioners apprehend the theory and practice of
promoting innovation and growth through intellectual property laws
today. In explaining the term "consumer welfare," Bork described the
reasons for the concept's appeal in regulating modern market
economies:
Consumer welfare is the greatest when society's economic resources are allocated
so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological
constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for
the wealth of the nation. . . . Consumer welfare .. . has no sumptuary or ethical
component, but permits consumers to define by their expression of wants in the
marketplace what things they regard as wealth. [Consumer welfare] can only
increase collective wealth by requiring that any lawful products ... be produced
and sold under conditions most favorable to consumers.
16
Similar accounts had appeared before,17 but Bork's was far and
away the broadest and most refined, and has continued to inspire
14. The standard definition equates market power with the power to raise or maintain
prices above the competitive level. Id. at 928-32. Many theorists criticize this definition because
it is based upon a model of perfect competition that does not reflect real-world markets, it could
suppress a wide variety of procompetitive behavior, and it is incompatible with antitrust
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and
Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in
Aftermarkets, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 143 (1996); Benjamin Klein & John Shepard
Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property
Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2002).
15. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993).
16. Id. at 90-91.
17. See e.g., Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1964); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 17 MISS. C. L.
REV. 7 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
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scholars and practitioners of antitrust, intellectual property, and other
areas of market regulation alike. Certain aspects remain doubtful: for
instance, whether the term "consumer welfare" refers to consumer or
total welfare,1 8 or the assumption that Bork really referred to
consumer surplus rather than to "the wealth of the nation."19 But the
three implicit core claims that followed from Bork's influential
paradigm are widely accepted. First, a consumer's maximization of
utility is revealed by his own purchasing behavior.20 Second, the
consumer welfare approach rests on a "neutral" principle to promote
progress to the extent that it ensures that the market itself caters to
consumers' tastes truly and well.2 1  Third, a market actor's
contribution to productive activity is induced primarily through
outside incentives which warrant recoupment of the costs of
innovation and allow-through exclusive control of production and
distribution-goods and services to be created that consumers actually
find valuable.22
Application of these three principles has led the
output/profitability test to emphasize, almost exclusively, the
importance of what this Article refers to as "intertype competition."
Such competition occurs between competitors "of the same type" as an
incentive to innovate. However, output/profitability thinking has
often disregarded another form of competition, which, for want of a
better term, will be called "intratype competition": an action or process
which takes place "with regard to, based on, or within a particular
type." Both categories of competition, in the modern economy, take
many forms: if branded goods are involved, scholars and courts speak
of the possibility of inter- versus intrabrand competition (e.g.,
competition between product manufacturers A and B, as opposed to
18. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Robert H. Lande, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not
Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989); Alan J. Meese,
Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard
Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010);
Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133
(2011); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard -
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOy. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2009).
19. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 321, 328 (6th ed. 2011).
20. P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA
61, 61 (1938).
21. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 217,
223 (2010) (arguing that Bork's work "brought order to antitrust law," and praising the
superiority and robustness of the consumer welfare standard).
22. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 11 (2003).
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competition between independent distributors or sellers of the same
branded goods produced by A or by B); if markets for products
("secondary goods") that are complementary to other products
("primary goods") are involved, scholars and courts refer to
inter- versus intrasystem competition (e.g., competition between one
branded ink cartridge/printer combination competing against another
branded ink cartridge/printer combination versus competition between
different brands of ink cartridges for a particular printer or
independent providers of repair parts and services for a particular
printer);23 if networks are concerned, a distinction may be made
between inter- versus intranetwork competition (e.g., competition
between computer operating systems manufacturers A and B as
against competition between independent software developers that
create their own applications for one of those systems).
24  The
standard test has come to expect that the most important incentives
for innovation are sufficiently, or perhaps exclusively, made available
through intertype competition, an explanation that is based on the
theoretical construct of perfect competitive conditionS
25-conditions
that, in the real world, are at most nearly approximated in
agricultural commodity trades or stock markets where long-term
ownership or the exchange of homogeneous goods is essential to the
working of the economy.26 Intertype competition is identified in
contemporary legal and economic theory as the mechanism that
promotes progress by inducing lower costs and prices for competing
(primary) products.
The possibility of promoting intratype competition, on the other
hand, entails that market actors must provide competitors with access
to their production output, at least at the stage of distribution or after
the first sale has been made. This is often thought to reduce the
incentive to invest in the production of goods and services in the first
place, in the same way that successful investors would have to share
their economically beneficial facilities with rivals who have refrained
from making such an investment. This view has proved to be
23. Gregory T. Gundlach & Albert A. Foer, The Future of Aftermarkets in Systems
Competition: An Overview of the American Antitrust Institute's Invitational Symposium, 52
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (2007).
24. Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and 'Essential Facilities': From Terminal Railroad to
Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 561 (2009).
25. But see generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009); RANDALL S. KROSZNER & ROBERT J. SHILLER, REFORMING U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS:
REFLECTIONS BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2013).
26. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A
RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 7-8 (8th ed. 1962).
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particularly threatening in light of the fear of free riding because
"[c]ompelling . . . firms to share the source of their advantage is in
some tension with the underlying purpose of [a competitive economy.]
[I]t may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to
invest in . . . economically beneficial facilities."27 The provision of
access can impair innovation because it deprives market actors of
their "legitimate rewards"28 and therefore necessarily contradicts
competition, because "to provide the benefits of the market system,
firms should compete, not collude. When firms deviate from the
rivalry of the marketplace to declare peace, antitrust law is rightly
concerned." And "[w]hen the victor has emerged through vigorous
rivalry, as opposed to collaborative activity . . . antitrust [and
intellectual property laws] normally refrain [] from turning upon the
winner. "29
When the Supreme Court adopted the results of Bork's
staggering efforts, it espoused a series of black-letter statements that
conclusively and categorically rejected the market access doctrine as
what some commentators had come to see as an independent market
regulatory paradigm in favor of the more analytically sound
output/profitability test.3 0 In the years following endorsement of the
output/profitability test's intertype competition framework, however,
several courts, including the US Supreme Court itself, delivered
opinions revealing varying degrees of judicial acquiescence to the
market access doctrine.31 Indeed, occasionally courts have seemed
27. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-
08 (2004).
28. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th Cir.
1980).
29. Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693
(2000). In Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 408, the Court warned that forced sharing
can "facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion" (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
30. Bork was quoted by the Supreme Court in some of the most influential antitrust
cases, including Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889, 897,
913-14 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318
(2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221, 233 (1993);
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430-31 (1990); Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 758 (1988); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 602-03 (1985); NCAA v. Board ofRegents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85,
101 (1984); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977).
31. These cases are discussed infra notes 119-58 and accompanying text. They include:
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 487 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601-02 (1985); Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
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profoundly apprehensive of the standard test's recommendation to
promote consumer welfare based on the view that enhanced producer
output will almost always lead to pro-competitive results. These
judicial demurrals are perplexing in light of the previously discussed
consensus among observers that the market access doctrine may in
one way or another be harmful to plaintiffs, defendants, and the
welfare of consumers. They are even more perplexing given that, as
critics have cautiously explicated, judicial opinions that purport to
apply the market access doctrine generally fail in practice to articulate
or apply anything beyond cloaked protection of competitors (notably
"small business" and the "underdog") instead of competition.
32
Importantly, even post-Bork market access opinions, which proclaim
an unyielding inclination to preserve an independent function for the
market access doctrine, have a tendency to conform to this pattern.
From the vantage point of apologists of the Chicago and post-Chicago
schools, therefore, sustained emphasis by observers on depicting the
courts' decisions.as something outside of the standard test's consumer
welfare paradigm raises redundant metaphorical embellishments.
33 It
propagates a false belief that the output/profitability doctrine's
intertype competition framework is unsettled and ambiguous when as
a matter of fact judicial consensus has been reached.
34
This Article studies the disjunction between language and
reality in post-Chicago antitrust and intellectual property law
decisions. It aims to demonstrate, first, that the doctrinal framework
established by the Chicago and post-Chicago schools is indeed an
accurate depiction of antitrust and intellectual property law litigation
in spite of the enduring presence of the market access doctrine.
Where courts have invoked the market access doctrine, they typically
express concern that the output/profitability test imposes an undue
burden on injured plaintiffs, particularly when such analysis is read to
require full-blown rule of reason analysis. They are also apprehensive
that the output/profitability test's intertype competition framework
fails to capture the entire spectrum of concerns relevant to antitrust
and intellectual property law and their goals of "promoting
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15
(D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact), affd in part and rev'd in part, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C.
2000) (conclusions of law).
32. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); BORK, supra note 15, at
50-89.
33. DAVID EVANS, FRANKLIN M. FISHER, DANIEL L. RUBINFELD & RICHARD L.
SCHMALENSEE, DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS? Two OPPOSING VIEWS 46 (2000).
34. Id.
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progress."35  As this Article will underscore, notwithstanding the
power of these critiques, courts applying the market access doctrine
have offered in the alternative only an ill-defined doctrinal edifice.
Whenever they apply the market access doctrine, this same concept
appears to collapse into the very output/profitability framework that
these courts purport to reject.
Second, this Article seeks to illuminate and explain the market
access doctrine's enduring presence, eventually suggesting a
reinvigorated interpretation of the doctrine that accomplishes its
function of making available a normatively desirable alternative to
the output/profitability test's intertype competition framework. The
choice between market access and output/profitability considerations
for market regulatory rulemaking represents the current debate in
regulating innovation regarding the respective roles of consumer
demands, which often pivot around qualitative aspects of progress
rather than rigorous output/profitability analysis.36  In order to
preclude the market access doctrine from working as a formless or
unstructured doctrine, as it has in the past, the focus ought to be
directed toward the manner in which consumer attitudes about
innovation and progress are likely to depart from the accepted test's
intertype competition approach.
Recent findings from cognitive psychological research point to
two general conclusions. First, a consumer's response to new
innovation often differs significantly from that of market regulators
and other expert observers. Second, while such divergence between
market regulators and consumer modes of assessing innovation may
be ascribed to different notions of "progress," a significant residual
core of divergence appears to spring from the failure of expert
output/profitability assessment models to accommodate areas of
important, sincere public concern. Given these two findings, this
Article concludes that antitrust and intellectual property law courts
should adopt a dual-test approach to include market access
considerations, resting antitrust and intellectual property law liability
either on a defendant's failure to pass output/profitability analysis or
on its failure to comport with a firmly established three-step test to
provide equal economic opportunities to compete. Such a construction
would help give effect to important consumer values that appear
unlikely to reveal themselves in the more narrowly delimited
intertype competition framework of the standard account's
35. See infra notes 119-58 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for
the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2012); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and
Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010).
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output/profitability test. At the same time, the dual-test approach
would acknowledge the fallibility of expert observers' perceptions of
what constitutes "progress" by including market access analysis as an
additional, less technically oriented standard for determining
antitrust and intellectual property law liability.
While the main argument of this Article is that market access
considerations are critical where the promotion of innovation is a
substantial concern, it refrains from making a claim as to the number
of possible relationships between market access considerations and
consumer welfarism (output/profitability) analysis generally. As will
be seen, market access considerations can be critical because
output/profitability analysis, properly done, gives substantial weight
to such considerations (these considerations could effectively be a
partial proxy for welfare) or because output/profitability analysis is
partly flawed. But failure to call a spade a spade-to admit the
importance of market access considerations as opposed to obscuring or
obfuscating them-runs the risk of producing erroneous decisions.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II offers a brief
synopsis of antitrust and intellectual property law's long battle to
develop a satisfactory test for the promotion of "progress," beginning
with the revolutionary but problematic consumer welfare language by
Chicago and post-Chicago school theorists and culminating in the
Supreme Court's unequivocal doctrine in GTE Sylvania. It further
references the spread of output/profitability thinking to intellectual
property law. Part III then reviews a series of court rulings issued
after the Supreme Court's adoption of the output/profitability test's
intertype competition framework, each of which expresses some
degree of hesitancy to renounce market access as an independent
means for finding antitrust and intellectual property law liability but
which nevertheless have failed to acknowledge the importance of
market access considerations and instead have disguised or concealed
them.
Despite the apparent ambitions but overall lack of success of
many courts to delineate a conceptually distinct function for providing
market access, Part IV submits that antitrust and intellectual
property law scholars should reexamine the much maligned market
access doctrine to ascertain what exactly courts are struggling to
achieve through its retention. It discusses more auspicious findings
that emerge from cognitive psychological literature addressing how
individuals assess innovation. Researchers in these fields have
discovered various insights in recent years regarding the fashion in
which consumers identify and deal with aspects of innovation and
progress that largely have been ignored in contemporary market
regulatory doctrine. Consequently, Part V arrives at the conclusion
2017] 483
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that the market access doctrine should be readdressed toward these
vital observations that are not as effortlessly incorporated within the
standard test's intertype competition formula. Such doctrinal
appreciation of the way consumers' assessments differ from those of
apologists of the conventional approach would help supplement the
growing technical orientation of antitrust and intellectual property
law by identifying particular areas in which output/profitability
analysis likely discounts or misses essential welfare-related variables.
Furthermore, since these consumer evaluations have been well
explained empirically, the approach recommended in this Article
would support courts in their ambitions to defend the interests of
ordinary consumers without resulting in the extent of arbitrariness
and ambiguity in application that earlier manifestations of the market
access doctrine have represented.37 In reality, a doctrine that aims to
defend market access would be premised on well supported, distinctive
notions of what it is that consumers actually expect from the modern
marketplace, and why it is that those expectations should ground a
standard of antitrust and intellectual property law liability.
II. THE CONSUMER WELFARE MAXIMIZATION DEBATE
Consider the following diverse arguments against servicing,
repairing, improving, reproducing, or copying a defendant's good,
service, or facility-some more refined, others distinctly less so.
First, in the late 1980s, independent service organizations
(ISOs) began servicing photocopiers and micrographic equipment
produced by Eastman Kodak Co. 38  In response, Kodak adopted
policies to limit the availability of replacement parts for its equipment
to ISOs and to make it more difficult for them to compete with Kodak
in servicing such equipment. Kodak claimed that its policies
prevented ISOs from "exploiting the investment Kodak ha[d] made in
product development, manufacturing, and equipment sales in order to
take away Kodak's service revenues."39
37. Several scholars have been skeptical of increasing antitrust and intellectual property
law's sensitivity to social science understandings of consumer perceptions. See Joshua D. Wright
& Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2011); Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Still Rare Like a Unicorn-
The Case of Behavioral Predatory Pricing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POLY 859, 860 (2011). But see Amanda
P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1531 (2011); Avishalom
Tor, Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 578 (2013).
38. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992).
39. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451 (1992) (No. 90-1029).
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Second, in the years following the US government's 1998 case
against Microsoft,40 David S. Evans and Richard L. Schmalensee-two
prominent American antitrust law scholars-assessed the economic
effects and policy issues underlying the case, and were highly critical
of the requirement that Microsoft share server technology, suggesting
an inappropriate condemnation of a simple refusal to deal. Why
should Microsoft, they asked, be required to assist rivals by providing
them with protocols which it had developed that work with its own
Windows operating system?4 1
Third, in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing
Group, Inc. ,42 the defendant produced trivia books about episodes and
characters from the Seinfeld television show. Despite the fact that the
producers of Seinfeld had no intent on entering the trivia book
market, the court found that the defendant illicitly reproduced the
plaintiffs copyrighted material because the plaintiff was entitled to
control any and all copying of its work, even if the defendant's copying
did not harm the copyright holder.
4 3
Fourth and finally, in a publisher's challenge to photocopied
college course packs-an instance that clearly seemed to fall under
copyright law's fair use doctrine because the purpose of the copying
was educational and because there was no appreciable harm to the
copyright holders-the Sixth Circuit found infringement of the
copyrighted works, concluding that publishers would cease to continue
publishing marginally profitable books if they were unable to look
forward to receiving permission fees and that artistic creativity would
be stifled if reduced economic incentives for publishers to publish
academic works meant that fewer academic works would be
published.44
Each of these examples involves some implicit argument of
denying access to a defendant's production output, and each supports,
in its own way, the classic idea that the production, creation, or
innovation of something new is stimulated by providing market actors
with the full revenue stream of foreseeable and unforeseeable profits
derived from the sale of permissions to use their goods, services,
works, or "inventions."4 5  When using the terms "producing,"
40. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
41. EVANS, FISHER, RUBINFELD, & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 45-86.
42. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2nd Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 143, 146.
44. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392, 1393 (6th
Cir. 1996).
45. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 3 (1991).
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"creating," or innovating something new, this Article refers to the
distribution, maintenance and repair, reproduction or improvement,
or reuse and redevelopment of goods and services, tangible or
intangible, including goods, works, and inventions that serve as
"platforms," i.e., "things allowing something else," such as equipment
that requires a combination of goods. In conceiving of tangible or
intangible goods as "platforms,"4 6 it will be possible to grasp why
antitrust and intellectual property laws have come to stress almost
exclusively the importance of "intertype competition"-the battle
among competitors "of the same type" as an incentive to innovate-but
often disregard "intratype competition"-an action or process which
takes place "with regard to, based on, or within a particular type."47
Despite frequent academic support for the promotion of
intratype competition, 4 8 American courts invariably have stopped
short of requiring defendants to grant access to their production
outputs irrespective of the implications that this will have for new
innovation.49 Consequently, courts have been tasked with fashioning
various doctrinal tests for ascertaining when such exclusionary
practices will be considered procompetitive so that its initiator bears
no responsibility for the costs of ensuing harm. This part traces the
development of the output/profitability concept that commentators
and courts have developed to justify such results, from its early
twentieth-century origins to it most recent incarnations in intellectual
property law jurisprudence.
A. The Output/Profitability Test
1. Output/Profitability Thinking in Antitrust Law
Antitrust law was much simpler prior to the US Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.50 Vertical restrictions other than mergers were not governed by
46. See Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological
Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057 (2013).
47. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
48. See e.g., DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51, 57 (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008); Warren S. Grimes, Dynamic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance: Inefficient Brand
Promotion, Higher Margins, Distorted Choices, and Retarded Retailer Innovation, 55 ANTITRUST
BULL. 101 (2010) [hereinafter Grimes, Dynamic Analysis]; Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing,
Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1995) [hereinafter Grimes, Brand Marketing]; Marina Lao, Resale Price
Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473 (2010).
49. See infra notes 50-100 and accompanying text.
50. See Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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the "rule of reason," and the content of the rule of reason was largely
unknown.51 Before GTE Sylvania, courts generally followed the goal
of the framers of the Sherman Act to be to protect the right of any
person to enter and pursue a line of work or business.
52 In GTE
Sylvania, the Supreme Court dismantled this goal of antitrust law by
popularizing what Bork and Chicago School economists had produced.
Given that the expansion and modernization of retail markets
meant that few products were purchased directly from their makers,
product manufacturers began to "plan" the promotional activities of
their dealers- 53much in the same way as a firm "plans" the activities
of its employees-at the same time endorsing reliance upon the
market as a central mechanism to distribute goods and allocate
resources.54 Such restraints may be "vertical" or "horizontal." The
former involve the establishment of minimum resale prices or
exclusive territories to dealers;55 the latter exist if a joint venture
between competitors imposes the same kinds of restrictions on
members that distribute the venture's product.56
For a long time, many of these restraints were considered to be
anticompetitive per se because they gave manufacturers a means of
controlling their goods "on the market" after they had already been
sold.57  Established to promote consumer welfare, antitrust laws
conventionally championed the idea that free competition and market
access are the norm and property rights-typically in the form of
51. The Court's only effort to provide some content to the rule of reason can be found in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) and in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948).
52. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 (1977); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN A.
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 119-64 (2010) for an illustrative analysis of the historical
evolution of the various interpretations of the Sherman Act.
53. Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553,
554 (2003).
54. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 460 (4th ed. 2011) ("These restraints are described as 'intrabrand,' because they
regulate a dealer's sales of a single brand without creating limitations on sales of brands made
by other suppliers.'.
55. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967), overruled in part by Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); see also Chi. Profl
Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 602-03 (7th Cir. 1996); Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (evaluating a joint
venture's imposition of minimum resale prices on members).
57. See generally Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 608; Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 152-54 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. at 382.
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contractual restraints on competition-are an exception to that norm
and that they were granted only when and to the extent it was
considered necessary to encourage innovation.5 8 But soon afterwards,
antitrust scholarship brought forward new explanations for such types
of distribution restraints. As enunciated clearly in GTE Sylvania,5 9 a
case involving territorial restraints imposed in order to prevent "free
riding" on a responsible dealer's advertising investments, the Supreme
Court clarified, albeit in a footnote-one that arguably became the
keystone for modern market regulation-that intertype (in the present
case, "interbrand") competition is the primary concern of antitrust
law. Intertype competition, in the Court's view, provides a significant
check on the exploitation of intratype ("intrabrand") market power
because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different segment
(i.e., a different "brand" of the same product).6 o
Even though this new rule was deceptively easy to formulate, it
required courts to weigh different economic effects against each other
and to determine whether the net result was competitive or
anticompetitive. Vertical territorial restraints, for instance, may
lessen competition among the dealers of the manufacturer imposing
the restraint, but they may also increase competition among the
brands of different manufacturers. While GTE Sylvania's analysis left
unresolved how a court should balance an increase in interbrand
competition against a decrease in intrabrand competition, the case
provides a key moment in the historical development of the
output/profitability test.
By recognizing an implied trade-off in the sale and distribution
of goods, and by refusing to condemn a manufacturer's attempted
contractual restriction on intrabrand competition, GTE Sylvania
followed through with the early movement away from the provision of
equal economic opportunities to compete-in the present case, the
ability of qualified sellers to distribute, advertise and sell the
defendant's goods as they see fit-as the predominant jurisprudential
paradigm to assessing anticompetitive restraints. Noting the
importance of the Court's concession, Richard Posner, in an influential
1981 article entitled The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,6 1 almost single-handedly62
58. Maxwell M. Blecher, Schwinn-An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust
Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 550 (1975); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2004); Pitofsky, supra note 5.
59. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 36 n.19, 52 (1977).
60. Id.
61. See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
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devised a conclusive test based on which the respective balancing had
to be conducted.63 According to Posner, in order to determine if a
restriction on distribution has increased competition, competition
must be evaluated by its "consequences," i.e., by whether it yields "the
consumer's preferred quality-price mix of a product" rather than by
"the presence or absence of a particular type of rivalry" such as price
competition. This determination entails focusing on whether a
restriction caused the firm's output to rise or fall: if the firm's output
rose, consumers must have found the product to be more appealing
and the increase in output must have exceeded any net reduction in
price and service competition among sellers of the same brand.
Taking everything else into account, increased sales demonstrate that
the overall effect of the restriction must be positive.64
Thus, while the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania had
recognized a basic trade-off between positive and negative efficiencies
in assessing the economic effects of vertical territorial restraints,
Posner firmly established a more administrable output/profitability
test for assessing distribution restraints by courts. This test is based
on the view, as Judge Learned Hand once stated, that "if buyers wish
to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery."
65 The
Supreme Court took the strict output/profitability concept and applied
it, amongst other things, to the law of vertical maximum price fixing
agreements in State Oil v. Khan;66 to minimum resale price
maintenance agreements in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc.;67 to predatory pricing practices in Matsushita v. Zenith
Radio Corp.,68 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,69 and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
62. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984).
63. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1965), for an earlier attempt to devise such a test.
64. Posner, supra note 61, at 21; see also Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1977).
65. Benton Announcements, Inc., v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir.
1942). But see Standard Brands, Inc., v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, n.13 (2d Cir. 1945), wherein Judge
Jerome Frank expressed doubt that this should be the law: ". . . non-economic snobbish desires of
consumers . . . and the satisfaction of their desires engendered by ignorance have been said to be
entitled to judicial protection, at least in the Federal Trade Commission cases . . . . It is perhaps
not inappropriate to ask whether snobbism and catering to ignorance are important social
interests deserving governmental assistance."
66. 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
67. 551 U.S. 877, 900 (2007).
68. 475 U.S. 574, 591 (1986).
69. 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
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Co.;70 to exclusive dealings in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co.;71 and to monopolization practices in Verizon Communications,
Inc., v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 72 As a result, today,
many courts hold that intratype competition cannot be lessened at all
unless the manufacturer imposing restraints has market power in the
traditional sense.73 As long as such restrictions increase a product
manufacturer's output-or even if they reduce output and increase
price74-Competition has not been restrained.75
2. Output/Profitability Thinking in Intellectual Property Law
Though observers typically associate output/profitability
thinking with antitrust law, the same mode of reasoning has become
common in intellectual property law to address similar concerns about
the profits that intellectual property rights holders may gain from,
and the incentives they may have to invest in, their creations. The
1976 Copyright Act's scope of derivative works is illustrative.
Congress at that point introduced a broad derivative works right,
conferring upon copyright holders the exclusive right not only to
control their original works but also to control any other work in
which the original work might be "modified, transformed, or
adapted."76 Though this change has been criticized by those who have
advocated in favor of spurring innovation as "hopelessly overbroad"
because all new works borrow and must necessarily borrow from or
build on existing works to some extent,77 it has come to be widely
accepted that a derivative use will infringe the copyright owner's
original work, particularly if the derivative use invades a market that
70. 549 U.S. 312, 318-19 (2007).
71. 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
72. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
73. See JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560,
1568 (11th Cir. 1983); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982); Muenster Butane v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1981).
74. In such a case, the conventional view holds that a balancing of intratype competition
against overall efficiency must take place: if product differentiation and a smaller number of
dealers permit a manufacturer to raise price above its marginal costs but the restraints improve
the quality of the distribution schema, thus making the manufacturer perform better vis A vis its
competitors, then the efficiency question reduces to whether the loss in allocative efficiency from
reduced dealer price competition is outweighed by the increase in productive efficiency that
results in "improved distribution."
75. HOVENKAMP, supra note 54, at 529.
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2012) (defining and granting derivative works right).
77. Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the copyright owner would likely exploit if he or she knew about it.7
8
Only if the derivative work "consumes" the underlying work, that is, if
the derivative use incorporates an actual copy of that work into each
derivative work (as in the case of tile art where, for every piece of tile
art created, the defendant must have purchased a copy of the
plaintiffs copyrighted art work),79 the copyright owner is deemed to be
already compensated for uses it should have expected when pricing
the first sale of the copyrighted work.
As a result of output/profitability thinking, the logic of when
the copyright owner should be entitled to compensation is no longer
based on a determination of whether the derivative work is truly
original or whether a permanent change to the original work has been
made. Instead, the justification for such copyright protection now
actually turns on the issue of whether the original copyright owner
has some control in terms of reaping (even unforeseen) economic
rewards. By granting a derivative work as broad a right as that
described in the 1976 Copyright Act, individuals and market actors
have become relatively unwilling to forgo any uncompensated
economic reward, no matter how remotely linked such reward is to the
original work.80
The growing influence of the standard account's intertype
competition framework also becomes visible in the ever-expanding
length of copyright duration. As traditionally construed, average
copyright duration is intended to reflect a balance between a reduction
of access costs for (prospective) creators and inventors, and copyright's
incentive effects, that is, the investment that they encourage with
respect to the creation of new works.8 1 Though courts typically have
not gone beyond this concern for encouraging new investment,
legislators have been apprehensive about optimizing- 82or indeed,
maximizing exploitation of--current uses of such property.
83
Another concern, copyright dilution,8 is most apparent in the
fourth factor of the statutorily prescribed fair use doctrine, which
78. Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 483, 634 (1996).
79. C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189, 192 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
80. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 979-80, 988 (2007). But see ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
COPYING? 1 (2015) (conceptualizing copyright law as a communicative act).
81. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 361 (1989).
82. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 226.
83. Id.
84. The basic concept can be found in the law of "trademark dilution," which protects a
trade symbol against uses that are likely to undermine a symbol's distinctiveness, unrestrained
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instructs courts to account for the impact of the defendant's
unauthorized use on the market of the plaintiffs work if that use were
to become widespread.85 In several cases, courts have considered not
only lost sales caused by the defendant's use to be a "harm" under this
factor, but also lost opportunities to obtain licensing fees for uses that
the copyright holder never contemplated.86 Courts, in such cases, ask
whether a defendant's particular use has merely deprived the
copyright holder of a "potential benefit" rather than whether it also
caused the copyright owner actual "harm."87 Under this approach, fair
use "excuses copying only where some instance of market failure, such
as prohibitively high transaction costs or externalities, prevents the
defendant from paying for what otherwise would be an economically
valuable use."88 Such a market failure approach implicitly supposes
an output/profitability-oriented view of copyrights that assumes harm
from infringement in the same manner that harm is assumed from
gaining access to an antitrust defendant's production output. As with
the protection of intertype competition, the copyright owner is
presumed to have an "entitlement for all uses of her copyrighted work
that violate her exclusive rights, whether or not such uses cause her
harm,"89 and an entitlement that allows control over all copying of
their works, even if those uses fall outside their intended or
foreseeable markets. Any protection that grants the copyright owner
less than that is deemed to discourage socially beneficial uses of
copyrighted works. As one commentator put it, "increasingly,
anything less than perfect control is thought to provide creators with
by a concern for confused consumers or competition and thus broader than traditional trademark
law (which is primarily concerned with the reduction of a customer's cost of collecting
information about competing products and services) would have supported. This is specified in
sections 43(c) and 45 of the Lanham Act, the stated purpose of which is to protect famous marks
against another firm making use of a substantially similar mark likely to cause dilution by
blurring or by tarnishment. Blurring, according to the statute "impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark" while tarnishment "harms the reputation of the famous mark." See §§ 43(c)(2)(B)
and (C), Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2012).
85. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
86. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1569, 1625 (2009); Bohannan, supra note 80, at 1569 (suggesting that the elements of the
tort of copyright infringement should change to require plaintiffs to prove foreseeability); see also
Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L.
REV. F. 62 (2009); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen, 122
HARV. L. REV. 81 (2009).
87. Balganesh, supra note 86, at 1569; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1384 (1989).
88. Bohannan, supra note 80, at 981.
89. Id. at 981-82.
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insufficient incentive. ... Over time, the increase of rights under
copyright law creates expectations among creators . . . and creators
form incentives based on those expectations."90
Advocates of the output/profitability view of copyright have
found evidence of their approach in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. Though in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that
the taping of individual copies of entire television programs for the
purpose of "time-shifting," or watching the programs at a later point in
time than they were broadcast, did not constitute copyright
infringement but rather was noninfringing fair use,91 the Court
allegedly did so only because of high transaction costs and low
anticipated profits.92 In Sony, while the exact copying of complete
television programs violated the copyright owners' exclusive right of
reproduction,93 the Court found in favor of fair use. The Court
determined that the amount home-tapers would pay to time-shift each
broadcast would be insignificant compared to the transaction costs
they would sustain in negotiating a license with each copyright
owner.94 Because it was improbable that these transactions would
take place, the market for time-shifting would ultimately collapse.
95
Courts have adopted the standard account's output/profitability
view in Ty, Inc. v. West Highland Publishing Inc., where the
defendant made a collector's book that included information about
Beanie Babies stuffed animals combined with buying
recommendations, price assessments, and historical essays.
96
Although there was no harm to any market that the plaintiff might
sensibly have sold or entered into, as the book was unlikely to
supplant sales of the Beanie Babies stuffed animals themselves or was
in competition with another book of Beanie Babies photographs, the
court concluded that Ty might suffer some harm in the distant future
because, "by recurring shortages Ty seeks to maintain the enormous
demand and popularity of Beanie Babies for as long as possible, and
90. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 435
(2006).
91. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420, 443, 456
(1984).
92. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1982).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
94. Gordon, supra note 92, at 1628-29.
95. Id. But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593-94 (1994); Harper &
Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985); Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
96. Ty, Inc. v. W. Highland Publ'g, Inc., 98 C 4091, 1998 WL 698922, *1516 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 5, 1998).
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consequently seeks to avoid overexposure of market saturation."97
Similarly, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,9 8
a case involving the portrayal of O.J. Simpson in a distinctive
scrunched and somewhat shabby red and white stove-piped hat
typically worn by the title character in The Cat in the Hat, the court
noted quite explicitly that the satirical use of the work was
"nontransformative and, admittedly commercial, [so that] market
substitution is at least more certain and market harm may be more
readily inferred."99 As the Seventh Circuit Court's "Beanie Babies"
cases suggest,100 courts' main concern in such cases does not revolve
around providing market access, but rather, from an ex post
perspective, to maximize output and profitability of what the
defendant has already established.
B. Dissatisfaction with the Market Access Test
Long before courts adopted output/profitability thinking,
academic commentators began noting the problems inherent in the
previous market access doctrine. For instance, scholars repeatedly
complained that the goal of providing equal economic opportunities to
participate in the competitive process provides too amorphous a basis
on which to assess antitrust (and intellectual property law) liability.
Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp note in their treatise that
such values rest on an ambiguous meaning and its tests are very
difficult to apply to discrete problems. Consequently, market access
97. Id. at *16. One might ask whether "market saturation" is the same as dilution. See
Sara Stadler, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOwA L. REV. 732 (2003), for an
argument that when trademark owners engage in brand extension, those marks become
ubiquitous and such ubiquity destroys uniqueness. Since without uniqueness there can be no
dilution by third parties, when it comes to dilution protection, ubiquitous marks need not apply.
Note, this Author explains that in the "Beanie Babies" cases, the court of appeals has a much
different view of the copyright status of the books based on its distinction between complements
and substitutes. While not necessarily persuasive, it at least purports to reject the district court's
type of reasoning.
98. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
99. Id. at 1403. Note that this case also involved a successful trademark infringement
claim. Id. at 1406. The formal copyright doctrine is that harm resulting from criticism does not
count in the fourth fair use factor. Courts, however, sometimes ignore this in practice, see, e.g.,
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), in which the court was arguably upset at the
crass treatment of J.D. Salinger's original novel The Catcher in the Rye by a Swedish author's
release of 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye that featured a ninety-year-old fictionalized
Salinger character that is haunted by a seventy-six-year-old version of Salinger's Holden
Caulfield.
100. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Ty, Inc. v. Le
Clair, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (N.D. Ill. 2000); W. Highland Publ'g, 1998 WL 698922; Ty, Inc. v.
GMA Accessories, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd, 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
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can be employed to justify almost any outcome that a court or jury
chooses to obtain.101 In a particularly memorable critique of the
doctrine's arbitrariness, Robert Bork recited a series of antitrust
issues, querying whether the extent of antitrust liability really should
hinge on a principle that may on the one hand preserve competition,
while on the other hand suppress it.102 Bork and other commentators
encapsulate the widely held view that market access provides only the
most meager and insufficient guidance for factfinders charged with
the difficult task of assessing the adequacy of antitrust and
intellectual property law liability. Without a doubt, to many analysts
the test is so elusive as to be lawless.
10 3
Scholars also have criticized the market access test based on
the observation that it offers little help in deciding cases where the
contractual or intellectual property rights holder will obtain a
dominant position or a monopoly, but in so doing reduces the costs of
serving the market to such an extent that the monopoly price is lower
than the market price was before the conferral of such rights.
1 0 4
Under such circumstances, the factfinder is advised to assess liability
with respect to market access that is expected to be meaningless.
Similarly, for a variety of differentiated goods, consumers may not
want to obtain service and repair from an independent company. In
such cases, "[w]hen consumers prefer the differentiated product and
hence make output restriction possible, they have shown that they
prefer the higher price for that product to a lower price for a
standardized product."1 0 5 To the extent that consumer preferences do
take this simplistic form ("[t]he sumptuary impulse has no legitimate
place in the interpretation of antitrust [and intellectual property] laws
that are necessarily premised on the ideal of the maximum
satisfaction of consumer wants as they exist"), the market access test
threatens to become, in practice, the very antagonist of contractual
and intellectual property rights holders that no American jurisdiction
has appeared ready to accept.
An altogether different objection to the market access test is
that the doctrine too easily works against defendants under
circumstances in which antitrust and intellectual property law
101. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 100-100c, at 1 (4th ed. 2014). For a more
differentiated analysis, see Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 253 (2003).
102. BORK, supra note 15, at 134-60.
103. Id. at 7-8 (citing Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust,
FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138) (speaking of a "crisis in antitrust").
104. For an overview of such critiques, see Posner, supra note 61, at 15.
105. BORK, supra note 15, at 313.
4952017]
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
liability might further the sole interests of individual plaintiffs. For
instance, because demand for market access generally derives from
impressions of the existing state of the marketplace for physical and
intellectual goods, less efficient market actors may request market
access even though a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits
of such access would not subject a market actor to antitrust or
intellectual property law liability. Considerations such as these led
the US Supreme Court in Trinko to provide a near-total departure
from market access as a means for promoting progress. The Trinko
Court noted that provision of market access can lead to an
underprovision of incentives for market actors, particularly in cases
where the monopolist created "something brand new"-in this case,
"the wholesale market for leasing network elements."10 6 In the Court's
view, "[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices is what attracts
'business acumen' in the first place."107 Monopoly power "induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth."10  The
imposition on monopolists of a duty to deal "can [therefore] result in
'false positive' mistaken inferences that chill the very conduct
antitrust laws are designed to protect."10 9
Sharing requirements, according to the output/profitability
view's intertype competition framework, erode a monopolist's
legitimate exploitation of its own innovations and chill incentives to
engage in the production of new goods and facilities in the first
place.110 Moreover, in this view, forced dealing creates a trap. "If two
firms start cooperating, the larger cannot back out without a good
business purpose."" "[S]uch an approach penalizes change and
therefore can make firms reluctant to enter [a business] initially." 112
Placing it squarely within the tradition of an incentives-based theory
of promoting progress, commentators have asserted that a market
access approach will not enable industry to innovate efficiently on the
introduction of new products that have been responsible for the high
standard of living in the industrialized world for almost a century.113
Some go so far as to claim that "legal [rules] of mandatory sharing and
106. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 399-400.
110. Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, B.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1245,
1260 (1991).
111. Frank Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
972, 973 (1986).
112. Dennis Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to
Deal-Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided 23-24 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8105, 2001).
113. Id. at 19.
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compulsory dealing requirements [are] inconsistent with the
exclusivity that is necessary to preserve incentives to create, the core
operative device of intellectual property [and antitrust] law in a
market economy."114  As industries now tend to depend less on
physical assets than on information, they will come to a halt unless
they can profit from the information they create.
III. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE MVARKET ACCESS PARADIGM
In most respects, output/profitability analysis has been an
unreserved success in the courts, for example, bringing considerable
clarity to the concept of what constitutes prevention of competitive
harms;1 15 exposing the fallacy of market regulatory policies based on
concerns about protecting individual businesses instead of protecting
competition;116 helping to promote the precedence of consumer
interests in the analysis of markets;
11 7 presenting a clear and
dispassionate legal standard sorely absent in many earlier
decisions;1 18 and creating a unifying legal doctrine that is compatible
with the views of many economists and legal scholars alike.
119
Commentators and courts have been less uniformly receptive,
however, of the output/profitability standard's function in promoting
innovation and its concomitant demotion of the market access doctrine
to a subsidiary role for purposes of antitrust and intellectual property
law litigation. Although the US Supreme Court recently expanded the
applicability of the output/profitability test's doctrinal framework with
respect to antitrust issues that have heretofore been treated as per se
114. Abbott B. Lipsky & Gregory J. Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1219 (1999).
115. BORK, supra note 15, at 303.
116. Id. at 205, 256-57.
117. For example, the Supreme Court addressed the "consumer welfare" standard in two
cases involving alleged predation, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993) and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007). The Court noted that, although predatory practices may be undesirable from a social
welfare perspective, lower prices are a "boon to customers" and are therefore lawful unless the
alleged predator succeeds in excluding competition and recouping its losses by raising prices.
Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224).
118. Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 217-18 ('"The Court had read into the Sherman Act an
assortment of vague and, ironically, anti-competitive social and political goals, such as protecting
small traders from their larger, impersonal (and more efficient) rivals.").
119. George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of the Antitrust Paradox, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 455 (2008).
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illegal, 120 in several cases courts have proclaimed their continued
commitment to the market access doctrine.12 1
This Part argues that in market regulatory domains in which
innovation is a substantial concern-which become more common
every day-something very similar if not essentially identical to the
much maligned market access rule tends to find its way into court
decisions (although these courts do not expressly renounce the
standard derision directed toward the market access rule). To be sure,
hardly anyone today would question that market access considerations
should generally be given significant weight by courts in domains in
which innovation is a substantial concern (much like the courts, many
scholars, even those adhering to output/profitability analysis, would
think that a sensible application of such analysis would give
substantial emphasis to market access considerations), or that market
access issues generally deserve significant weight in domains in which
innovation is a major issue. This Part will, however, show that failure
to admit the importance of market access considerations runs the risk
of producing erroneous decisions: according to the courts, most market
access decisions could easily have gone the other way, and yet in
retrospect, many commentators have agreed that those decisions were
rightly decided.
Such cases are a mystery for many antitrust and intellectual
property law scholars. How does one explain the dedication of judicial
authorities to a doctrine that learned observers-with considerable
experience and after much deliberation-have concluded is
conceptually inferior to the output/profitability test and its recognized
counterparts? This Part explores that question, contemplating
whether courts issuing these opinions have simply failed to rationalize
market access considerations, whether commentators have missed
something substantial in their reading of the case law, or whether
some other aspect altogether elucidates the puzzling persistence of the
market access paradigm.
A. The Enduring Presence of the Market Access Doctrine in the Courts
One of the most prominent examples in which the
output/profitability view's intertype competition framework suffered a
judicial rebuke is found in United States v. Microsoft Corp.122 Issubd
on April 3, 2000, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson expressly declined
120. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
121. See infra notes 119-58 and accompanying text.




the view that access to a defendant's production output ought to be
denied,123 based on the underlying supposition that because Microsoft
dominated its network for computer operating systems, which in turn
dominated the market that it served, highly creative innovations (both
intra- and inter-network) were unable to find a market as there was
no easy way to make them compatible with the rest of the network.
Notwithstanding the possibility that over time an alternative
operating system could supplant Windows or force it to provide
interoperability information, without reasonable access for rivals'
server software, the resulting entrenchment directed innovation along
a specific path and gravely constrained the innovations of others.
124
The Microsoft decision echoes earlier verdicts issued by the US
Supreme Court that pronounced distrust of the output/profitability
test's intertype competition framework and their strong ambition to
adhere to the market access doctrine. For instance, in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court
rejected Kodak's position that ISOs, which put substantial efforts into.
the service market, should be denied access to the equipment market
to provide Kodak customers with complementary services.
126 This
reasoning also is represented in Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing,127 where the Supreme Court decided that Ski Co., a large
skiing company, violated the antitrust laws by refusing to cooperate in
a joint venture with Highlands, a smaller company, to promote and
advertise "All Aspen" tickets that would permit skiers to ski the entire
mountain area.128
Other courts have signaled their disagreement with the
output/profitability test's intertype competition framework in
intellectual property law cases. In one of the most famous copyright
law opinions of this sort, the First Circuit Court ruled in Lotus
Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. that Borland,
a company that facilitated software deployment projects, was allowed
to use the menu tree developed by Lotus-i.e., the words and structure
of Lotus's software command hierarchy-to build a rival spreadsheet
program and to make this program compatible with and familiar to
users of Lotus's 1-2-3 software.129 Lotus argued that Borland should
123. 87 F. Supp. 2d 30.
124. Id. at 39.
125. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
126. Id. at 486.
127. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
128. Id. at 610.
129. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516
U.S. 233 (1996) (by an equally divided court).
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not be allowed to include a "virtually identical" copy of the entire
Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree in its own Quattro and Quattro Pro version 1.0
programs, even though Borland did not copy any of Lotus's underlying
computer code. Instead, Borland copied only the words and structure
of Lotus's menu command hierarchy to make its programs compatible
with Lotus 1-2-3 so that spreadsheet users who were already familiar
with Lotus 1-2-3 would be able to switch to the Borland programs
without having to learn new commands or rewrite their Lotus macros.
The court disagreed with Lotus's argument that competition on the
platform it established ought not to be allowed and that by declining
to protect its user interface, its invention would become a resource in
which no other market actor would have wanted to invest.130 Instead,
the court held that Borland could not compete without gaining access
to Lotus's user interface, as many consumers had already embraced
it.131
In at least two further cases, the Ninth Circuit Court chose to
allow access to a market actor's production output as well. In Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,132 Accolade, an independent
developer, manufacturer, and marketer of computer entertainment
software, including game cartridges that are compatible with Sega's
"Genesis" game console, reverse engineered Sega's video game
programs to discover the compatibility requirements with Sega's game
console. Accolade then created its own games for the "Genesis,"
relying solely on the interface specifications it derived from Sega's
games (i.e., without copying Sega's program code itself). The court
ruled that "intermediate copying"133 of computer object code
(Accolade's reverse engineering of Sega's computer software in order
to publish games for Sega video consoles) constituted fair use when
such use was necessary to obtain access to the functional elements of
the copyrighted program itself.134
In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,135
the court held that intermediate copying of a copyrighted BIOS
software constituted fair use when such use involved the creation of a
"wholly new product, notwithstanding the similarity of uses and
functions."136 Connectix made and sold a software program called
130. Id.
131. Id. at 819-22 (Boudin, J., concurring).
132. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. Intermediate copying refers to the copying of a work during the process of analyzing
or reverse engineering. Id.
134. Id.
135. 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
136. Id. at 606-07.
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"Virtual Game Station." The purpose of this program was to emulate
on a regular computer the functioning of the Sony PlayStation console,
so that computer owners who buy the "Virtual Game Station" software
can play Sony PlayStation games on their computers. While the
"Virtual Game Station" did not contain any of Sony's copyrighted
material, Connectix reverse engineered Sony's BIOS in order to find
out how the PlayStation worked and, ultimately, to produce the
"Virtual Game Station." Despite some commentators' complaints that
the Connectix approach to providing market access was less sensible
than the one in Sega, because the purpose of providing access was to
compete with the original platform, while in Sega the provider of the
application merely created a complementary good,
137 in both
instances, the court seemed to give clear priority to the idea of market
access over obstinately protecting exclusive ownership to incentivize
innovation. 138
B. The Failure of Courts to Admit the Importance of Market Access
While courts-including the Supreme Court-have sustained
some measure of disagreement with the output/profitability test's
intertype competition framework, those that have espoused a market
access approach applied it in such a manner that it became effectively
indistinguishable from the doctrinal framework employed in ordinary
cases and the output/profitability standard itself.
139
The Lotus case provides ample support for this argument.
After setting out the requirements for copyright infringement, the
Lotus court proceeded to outline the state of the law with respect to
the question of whether the Lotus menu command hierarchy
constituted a copyrightable "expression" or an uncopyrightable
"method of operation," a means "by which a person operates
something, whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer."
140
The court held that the Lotus menu command hierarchy was an
uncopyrightable method of operation because it provided the "means
by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3,"141 because it "[did]
not merely explain and present Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities to
the user," and because it was "different from the underlying computer
137. Ivan Rothman, From Sega to Sony and Beyond: An Alternative Legal Basis for
Software Reverse Engineering, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 1, 6-7 (2000).
138. But see Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(denying market access).
139. BORK, supra note 15, at 134-60.
140. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995).
141. Id.
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code."14 2  Apart from these observations, the Lotus court did not,
however, expressly recognize that at least part of the issue revolved
around whether (and to what extent) the establishment of a platform
required competitors to gain access to it so as to enable innovation.143
Such an inference would have been precisely the type of question that
the market access doctrine required the court to investigate. Based on
the court's single analysis of whether the Lotus menu command
hierarchy constituted a copyrightable "expression" or an
uncopyrightable "method of operation," the case could easily have gone
the other way. Significantly, under the district court's reasoning, the
Lotus menu command hierarchy with its specific choice and
arrangement of command terms constituted a copyrightable
"expression" of the "idea" of operating a computer program with
commands arranged hierarchically into menus and submenus.144
The First Circuit, in response to this argument, held that
"Lotus' decision to employ hierarchically arranged command terms to
operate its program could not foreclose its competitors from also
employing hierarchically arranged command terms to operate their
programs, but [that] it did foreclose them from employing the specific
command terms and arrangement hat Lotus had used."145 The court,
however, failed to address the more intricate issue of why, and under
what circumstances, Lotus's established standard needed to be shared
through some form of open access arrangement. Instead, it simply
noted that given the possibility of foreclosing competitors from
employing the specific command terms and arrangement that Lotus
had used, "the initial inquiry is not whether the Lotus menu command
hierarchy incorporates any expression [but rather the] initial inquiry
is whether the Lotus menu command hierarchy is a 'method of
operation."'14 6  This line of reasoning fundamentally obscures the
relevant market access issues at stake: the court obviously relied in its
determination of eligibility for copyright protection (i.e., if the "initial
inquiry" was whether the Lotus menu command hierarchy
incorporates any "expression" or constitutes a "method of operation")
on a preliminary assessment of the potential foreclosure effects to
intratype competition. In making this determination, the court failed
to render explicit the potential (economic, incentive, or welfare) effects
of copyright protection for the amount and kind of innovation it
intended to promote.
142. Id.
143. But see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
144. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68, 70 (D. Mass. 1990).
145. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995).
146. Id. at 816.
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Perhaps more strikingly, the Sega court failed to expressly
distinguish between the conventional output/profitability test's
intertype competition framework and a more flexible inquiry that
would have allowed for explicit consideration of market access. In its
decision, the Sega court employed conventional output/profitability
reasoning directly, conceding under the fourth factor of the fair use
doctrine that by allowing market entry to new competitors, Accolade's
disassembly of Sega's software indubitably had an indirect effect on
the market for Genesis-compatible games. However, since consumers,
in this market, typically purchased more than one game belonging to a
particular category and since Accolade's and Sega's games arguably
were not "substantially similar," the court found no basis for assuming
that Accolade's product had significantly affected the market for
Sega's games.147
Apart from the fact that the court considered the possibility of
a potential market effect the defendant's use might have had on the
plaintiff (required to be taken into account within the fourth prong of
the fair use doctrine), it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern a
consequential difference between the Sega court's provision of market
access and the well-established doctrinal framework within which
courts have employed conventional output/profitability reasoning.
Even though the Sega court noted that "an attempt to monopolize the
market by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to
the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot
constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the
fair use doctrine,"148 it failed to make market access considerations
explicit, with the result that the case could have turned out just the
opposite. After all, the court made its determination "that the fourth
statutory factor weighs in Accolade's, not Sega's, favor [. . .]
notwithstanding the minor economic loss Sega may suffer."
149 In
reaching its decision as to whether Sega's "minor economic loss" would
weight in favor of or against eligibility for copyright protection, the
court evidently contemplated the "[possibility] for others to
compete."15 0  Instead of explaining the importance of this
consideration, the amount and kind of economic loss necessary, and its
implications for innovation and consumer welfare, the court simply
considered the effects of market foreclosure a contradiction "to the
147. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1992).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1524.
150. Id. at 1524-25
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statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and . . . a strong
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine."1 5 1
Other market access cases also support the argument
regarding doctrinal confusion of market access considerations, despite
their apparent support of the market access doctrine's intratype
competition approach. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court in
Connectix also accepted the validity of output/profitability analysis
within the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine as a guide in
determining the underlying issue of market access.152 As in Sega, the
court noted "[. . .] some economic loss by Sony as a result of this
competition does not compel a finding of no fair use. Sony
understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play
games Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does
not confer such a monopoly."153 Thus, although the court professed to
have reaffirmed its general support of the market access paradigm, it
did not make market access considerations explicit (even based on
conventional output/profitability reasoning, the court would at least
have been required to consider the costs and benefits-to consumers,
competitors and innovation-resulting from granting or denying
market access).
Furthermore, even the Supreme Court's decision in Aspen
demonstrates some sort of a collapsing of the output/profitability and
market access frameworks. Although critics contend that market
access cannot possibly improve consumer welfare because monopolists
will charge rivals the same supracompetitive prices for their goods and
will then pass on those costs to consumers so that both output and
price will remain the same,15 4 the Supreme Court recognized that
more benefits would accrue to consumers as a result of granting
market access than reduced ski ticket prices and increased output,
including competition for new forms of advertising and distribution
based on the shared platform.5 5 This recognition notwithstanding,
Aspen nevertheless employed the language of numerous




153. Sony Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2000).
154. Hylton, supra note 110, at 1260.
155. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
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[ulnlike cooperative conduct that may lessen the incentive for participants to
compete against one another, a properly designed all-area ticket, in addition to
offering an improved service, may maintain incentives of participants to compete
against one another. By attracting more skiers to its lifts, a participant can
increase its share of all-area pass revenues.
156
Looking at the Court's ruling with the benefit of hindsight, the Court
arguably recognized the beneficial effects of sharing outside of
high-technology markets. Like other market access decisions, the
Court's vernacular, however, lead observers to classify its verdict as a
case that essentially adheres to output/profitability reasoning ("By
attracting more skiers to its lifts, a participant can increase its share
of all-area pass revenues"), and ultimately equates market access with
output/profitability thinking.157
Finally, just as the Supreme Court did in Kodak, the Microsoft
court15 8 resisted the trend to undermine the nominally independent
output/profitability test.159  In Microsoft, the court focused on
Microsoft's 'dominance,' which was protected by high "application
barriers to entry" (the vast libraries of existing Windows-compatible
software not generally available on other systems) and the fact that
there was no commercially viable alternative to Windows.
160 Since
Microsoft decided to tie Internet Explorer to Windows rather than
relying on the power of the very competitive PC market in its decision
to produce what consumers really wanted, the court concluded that
Microsoft "used its dominance in the Windows operating system to
monopolize the browser market" and unlawfully tied purchase of its
Internet Explorer to Windows.161 However, the relevant concerns
were so complex and difficult to determine with certainty that
competition authorities (expert testimony) could only guess (based on
the best models and methods of extrapolation) what might have been
the chain of effects set off by Microsoft's conduct. Where the plaintiff
vigorously insisted that "Microsoft severely hampered Netscape in
browser competition and blunted the threat that software developers,
156. Warren A. Grimes, A Tale of Two Ski Towns: New Perspectives on a Dominant
Firm's Refusal to Deal with a Rival, in TECHNOLOGIE ET CONCURRENCE - TECHNOLOGY AND
COMPETITION: MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE HANNS ULLRICH - CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF
HANNS ULLRICH 451, 453-54 (Josef Drexl ed., 2009).
157. See George L. Priest & Jonathan Lewinsohn, Aspen Skiing: Product Differentiation
and Thwarting Free Riding as Monopolization, in ANTITRUST STORIES 229, 253-54 (Eleanor M.
Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
158. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
159. Id. at 51. For a critique of the conventional economic tests for bundling and tying,
see generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit 'Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 397-481 (2009).
160. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 82-83.
161. Id. at 70.
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writing for a browser platform, would write a platform not under
Microsoft's control,"162 the defendant-which had a number of
distinguished economists on its side-forcefully maintained that such
assertions were nothing short of "speculation" and "conjecture."163
Because of a general lack of certainty pervading the market
regulatory context, Microsoft's behavior could just as easily have been
defended on the basis of economically sound principles. Yet
retrospectively, many commentators would perhaps agree that
Microsoft was rightly decided. It is, for instance, well recognized that
Microsoft would not have been deterred from putting an effort in
developing Windows had it known beforehand that it would be denied
the opportunity to bend the server market by refusing to license
interoperability information (note that licensing involved sharing "on
market terms") to its competitors.164 Similarly, few commentators
would perhaps believe today that Kodak would have refrained from
manufacturing high-end printers had it known that it was not going to
be allowed to exclude all original equipment manufacturers' ink
cartridges to be sold on the secondary market, not just those that were
supposedly inferior.165 Despite the way in which those cases were
ultimately resolved, courts have failed to furnish a clear test capable
of capturing those attributes of progress that the provision of market
access required them to consider and that resembled an affirmative
defense for market actors seeking access to a dominant platform, or a
mechanism for easing the evidentiary burdens of injured competitors
and consumers.
C. Possible Explanations for the Enduring Presence of the Market
Access Doctrine
As explained in the previous section, there is much truth to the
assertion that courts have not successfully established a conceptually
distinct doctrinal function for the market access paradigm. Still, a
number of courts have responded with a palpable lack of sympathy to
some commentators' efforts noting that, in the empire of the
output/profitability's intertype competition paradigm, the king can do
162. EvANs, FISHER, RUBINFELD & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 3.
163. Id. at 46.
164. Lao, supra note 24, at 593.
165. See e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861,
875-76 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (describing lock-out microchip technology on printer cartridges). Such a
technology excludes all competitors' cartridges, not simply those that might be inferior even if
this microchip might be conceived of as a quality control mechanism to the extent that use of
rivals' ink cartridges leads to inferior results. See id.
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no wrong.166 Rather than a doctrine that ultimately will be given up
as a matter of pragmatic inevitability,1 67 market access may have
permanence despite its (wholly recognized) deficiencies.
This prospect causes one to look past the probability that
market access merely stands for a temporary stopping place in the
historical unfolding of consumer welfare analysis as the dominant
standard for assessing allegedly anticompetitive restraints. In light of
the above, one is tempted to conclude that importance of the market
access rule ebbs and flows; while it may have made good sense
historically, with advances in economic thinking, it fell into disfavor
(as the US Supreme Court in Brown Shoe famously noted, "the
legislative history [of the Sherman Act] illuminates congressional
concern with the protection of competition, not competitors"),
168 and
now, in our "new economy," it is again ascendant.
Toward that end, this Section contemplates several alternative
explanations for the enduring presence of the market access doctrine,
even though courts have failed thus far to articulate a normatively
distinct function of such a doctrine. First, courts may have identified
practical benefits to clinging to an alternative formulation of the
promotion of progress, even if they sense that this formulation largely
represents the output/profitability test's intertype competition
framework. Second, courts may recognize the vagueness inherent in
the output/profitability standard's intertype competition paradigm,
and yet find comparable shortcomings in the market access approach.
And third, in light of their recognition that the conventional
output/profitability test's intertype competition framework fails to
promote a sufficient extent of innovation, courts simply and sincerely
may be going to great lengths, albeit with little success, to find a
separate and distinct function for the market access test. The latter
account, which takes courts at face value in their expressed attempt to
devise a normatively independent function for market access analysis
and which will be set out in Section D, affords a point of departure for
Part IV of this Article, which seeks to explicate just such a function.
1. Pragmatic Justifications
Unlike the apologists' perspective, courts that have given
priority to market access may believe that the universe of possible
antitrust and intellectual property law cases is better represented by a
166. See supra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
167. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 631-32 (2000).
168. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis omitted).
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scenario in which the category of anticompetitive restraints that must
be assessed by a market access approach forms a significant
component of consumer welfare analysis that the conventional
output/profitability intertype competition framework cannot capture.
Current market regulatory theory teaches us that antitrust law
should protect competition, not competitors,169 and that intellectual
property law should protect innovation, not innovators.170 But with
the shift in the twenty-first century from commodity markets to
cultural networks and the growing commodification of cultural time
and human relationships that render the exchange of property as such
less meaningful, and access to lived experiences as the consummate
commodity determining the features of one's status, "consumers" now
may be among the "competitors" and "innovators." This approach to
the promotion of progress, which defines one aspect of progress to be
the degree to which consumers themselves are able to participate in
the construction of our economy renders plain the need for courts to
establish a dialectical relationship between copying and protecting,
and between producing and consuming, as consumers often will find
themselves in the role of second generation users, appropriating,
criticizing, building on, and responding to the property of first
generation producers.
Certainly, the notion of consumers as producers or creators is
prominent in intellectual property law. But it is of growing
importance in antitrust law as well.1 71 Imagine a market in which
only competition between product manufacturers of different brands,
for example, exists. In such a market, courts almost inevitably worry
solely about providing consumers with an adequate level of influence
in terms of choosing between them, as if no other options exist. Such a
market offers consumers the possibility to choose between Levi and
Armani jeans, between Apple and Samsung tablets, between Ford and
BMW cars, and the like. What is more, consumers' ability to "vote" in
such a marketplace remains firmly rooted in an opportunity to buy
Levi jeans in Levi stores, sold at the terms and conditions that Levi
suggests, to purchase Armani jeans in Armani stores, sold at the
terms and conditions that Armani suggests, and so on. But these
possibilities are not the only ones conceivable, perhaps not even the
most important ones, for consumers seeking to exert a significant
influence on the type of economy and society they desire to inhabit.
Consider the various types of innovations that less proprietary forms
169. Id.
170. Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not
Innovators, 38 RUTGERs L.J. 365 (2007).
171. See infra notes 233-45 and accompanying text.
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of production and distribution have brought to our economies. In
highly decentralized and user-driven markets, consumers often wield
a significant amount of influence over what is being produced and
offered, because consumers routinely govern markets as users
themselves.17 2 They regularly modify, maintain, and repair existing
goods and commodities, to the extent that what traditional
manufacturers produce is developed in cooperation with consumer
groups and users, and is enhanced and modified by user-driven
innovation. Choosing between distinct platforms, networks, or brands
of different manufacturers is thus not the only path of influence for
consumers. They can exercise sovereignty in their ongoing dialogue
with the market by altering the terms of sale, by making apposite
suggestions on how existing goods should be modified, reused, or
improved. In a market with intratype competition, consumers have
competitive choices not only in the initial purchase of a printer, for
example, but in the subsequent repair and maintenance of the printer
throughout its life cycle. In such markets, independent
manufacturers, dealers, and service providers can make productive
(re)use of the goods, services, or works somebody else has produced.
The same holds true with respect to a computer's unused excess data
storage capacity, the unused excess capacity of cars, bicycles, and
other products that can be more efficiently harnessed and allocated
through sharing rather than through exclusive ownership.
From this perspective, resorting to market access as an
independent doctrine may be a practical response to the perceived
distribution of thinkable market regulatory scenarios.173  Market
access reasoning is crucial to evaluating anticompetitive restraints
when output/profitability analysis provides an ill-formed or otherwise
inadequate basis for assessing antitrust and intellectual property law
liability. However, the market access doctrine is not construed as a
mere exception to some more general rule of output/profitability
maximization. As an alternative, given the perceived frequency of its
significance in modern markets, market access is treated as a primary
and independent doctrine that must supplement output/profitability
considerations.17 4
172. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 2 (2005).
173. A growing body of literature emphasizes the importance of promoting innovation
rather than solely static efficiency in antitrust and intellectual property law. See, e.g., MICHAEL
A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (2009); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND
INCENTIVES (2004); Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS.
L. REV. 891 (2012); Shelanski, supra note 36, at 1673.
174. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 30-50 (expressing conviction that market access
plays a dominant role in the regulation of contemporary markets); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The
Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611 (2010).
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The manner in which a particular doctrine is constructed may
be seen to pivot on the sort of judicial error that courts intend to
minimize. By treating market access as an independent means of
establishing antitrust or intellectual property law infringement, the
market access framework seems designed to minimize cases in which
consumer welfare is erroneously deemed to be hampered due to
background assumptions about the limited opportunity of rivals to
compete. Conversely, the output/profitability test, by implicitly
deeming equal economic opportunities to compete anomalous or
exceptional, seems designed to minimize cases in which consumer
welfare is erroneously found to be hampered through overly generous
application of granting equal economic opportunities to compete. The
choice of doctrinal construction consequently rests, at least partially,
on the policy question of whether one prefers judicial errors to occur in
the favor of existing business or (potential) competitors.175
With that choice in mind, one can better understand the
reluctance of some courts to openly espouse a market access
framework. After all, the history of antitrust and intellectual property
law jurisprudence is peppered with glib encomia to the consumer,
whose covetous customs are perceived as representing the driving
force behind the accomplishments of contemporary capitalism, but
whose misery and credulity are viewed as requiring steady protection
by the courts.176 While modern decisions address consumers with
little contempt, courts nevertheless remain proud of their pioneering
175. The bulk of the literature has focused on minimizing "type 1" errors, i.e., on
minimizing the prohibition of mistakenly procompetitive activities as opposed to the
minimization of "type 2" errors, i.e., the minimization of the permission of anticompetitive
practices. The former are held to be costlier than the latter. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). Commentators who have emphasized the importance of
promoting innovation are increasingly skeptical towards this view. See, e.g., RUBINFELD, supra
note 48, at 57-58.
I am troubled that the concern about false positives (bringing inappropriate cases) has
tended to trump worries about false negatives (failing to bring appropriate cases).
Losing cases or those that are seen as inappropriate often come under visible attack,
whereas one has to listen carefully to hear about cases that should have been pursued
that were not. Furthermore, the move to dispense with difficult vertical issues (price
and non-price restraints) may be too forceful. While many economists see great value
in the use of rule of reason in the evaluation of vertical restraints, it is important to
acknowledge that some restraints may on balance be anticompetitive. Per se legality
is not where antitrust should be located. . . . The economics of innovation is no doubt
quite difficult, and our empirical knowledge is limited. However, innovation is too
important for antitrust to use the limits of our knowledge as an excuse for failing to
take action in appropriate cases.
Id.
176. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 15, at 314-20; Posner, supra note 13, at 938; George J.
Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
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role in the antitrust and intellectual property law revolution and their
commitment to the norm of promoting, and protecting, consumer
welfare.1 77 Thus, in addition to the practical considerations described
above, courts also seem concerned about the expressive implications of
their approach, notwithstanding the apologists' otherwise accurate
observation regarding the functional equivalence of both doctrinal
frameworks. Put differently, relegating the protection of "consumer
welfare" to an unequivocally subordinate role might create the
impression that courts have left behind their determination to
guarantee the self-actualization and satisfaction of consumers in the
modern marketplace.
2. The Indeterminacy Problem
On top of the pragmatic justifications described in the previous
subsection, another possibility for the willingness of some courts to
embrace market access while simultaneously refusing to endorse the
doctrine more explicitly may be that these courts perceive as much
ambiguity in such a doctrine as apologists do in the
output/profitability test. After all, Richard Posner, who provided
antitrust law's most famous formal expression of output/profitability
analysis for territorial restraints within a court's pronounced rule of
reason inquiry in The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, also held the view that
[a] standard so poorly articulated and particularized, applied by tribunals so poorly
equipped to understand and apply it, places at considerable hazard any restriction
that a manufacturer imposes on its dealers and distributors.
1 78
If even the foremost originator of output/profitability analysis
in antitrust law found its precision "vacuous," "unlimited," "free-
wheeling," and "vague,"179 some jurisdictions may continue to embrace
market access simply because they do not perceive an evidently
superior alternative.
Despite Posner's admonition, courts and scholars for decades
seemed to take the analytical clarity of the output/profitability test's
cost-benefit balancing method as an article of faith, particularly when
compared to a market access inquiry.18 0 In a number of recent articles,
177. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text.
178. See Posner, supra note 61, at 15; Posner, supra note 64, at 16 ("The Rule of Reason
in its present state is a poor guide to the decision of [antitrust] cases.").
179. Posner, supra note 61, at 14-15.
180. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare
Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2422 (2012) (arguing that output/profitability
thinking "quite comfortably incorporates the tradeoffs between price and quality that consumers
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however, commentators have begun to argue that while
output/profitability reasoning can be helpful in analyzing competition,
it fails to provide a clear answer most notably where conduct by a
dominant firm seems to create some efficiencies, but at the same time
has demonstrably exclusionary effects.181 As these scholars argue, if
enhanced producer output would always lead to pro-competitive
results, a monopoly firm's exclusionary conduct would almost never be
objectionable because the dominant firm could increase both output
and price while excluding competitors from the relevant market.182
Furthermore, switching consumers from one firm to another always
will result in a private gain for the dominant firm, but will not always
advance the forms of commerce that consumers ultimately desire.183
Exclusionary conduct, therefore, often is much more difficult to detect
because such conduct commonly assists consumers in the short term.
Such an analysis falls short, however, of the long-term implications of
such a strategy for consumers, competitors, and the economy. While
courts typically are capable of arriving at a determinate answer as to
the overall welfare effects of allegedly anticompetitive conduct in
ordinary cases,18 4 a balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects
where exclusionary conduct and cumulative innovation is involved
often is deemed to be almost impossible given difficulties in weighing
short and long term effects on the consumer.185
As this subsection attempts to show, both formulations of
assessing anticompetitive restraints in American antitrust and
intellectual property law seem destined to result in a fair amount of
uncertainty in application. In light of such vagaries, courts giving
precedence to market access may do so simply because they do not
believe that the output/profitability test provides a clearly preferable
alternative. After all, the market access doctrine asks a largely
face"). For Wright and Ginsburg, the flaw of other standards is that "[they] altogether reject the
economic approach to dealing with these tradeoffs . . . ." Id.
181. See, e.g., EVANS, FISHER, RUBINFELD & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 45-86;
Ross, supra note 5; Shelanski, supra note 36, at 1667-68; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology
of the Economic Analysis ofLaw, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1, 3-48 (1975).
182. See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competitive Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
527 (2013).
183. See Grimes, Dynamic Analysis, supra note 48, at 122-23; Grimes, Brand Marketing,
supra note 48.
184. This often is the case in non-price vertical restraints and multi-market mergers. See
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977).
185. This difficulty is exacerbated and stakes are even higher if distant, uncertain
positive spillover and network effects are involved. See, e.g., William H. Page & Seldon J.
Childers, Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in Platform Markets: Microsoft and Intel, 78




factual question regarding the extent of new innovation that
consumers expect a particular commodity to provide.186  The
output/profitability test, on the other hand, contemplates a
multi-factored analysis of competing commodities followed by an
instrumentalist query that at times appears fundamentally
inconsistent with the normative intuitions and cognitive thought
processes of wide segments of the population, including many
judges.187 Given such a choice of second-best doctrines, some courts
may simply give priority to one brand of uncertainty over another.
D. An Independent Function for Market Access
1. The Indeterminacy Problem Revisited
One significant doctrinal reason that market access courts
object to the output/profitability test's intertype competition
framework is that the assumption that this framework will
necessarily promote consumer welfare in every case often results in a
mere inference, rather than a conclusive determination, in relation to
a given set of particular facts. Thus, putting aside the pragmatic and
expressive interests served by treating market access as a nominally
independent doctrine, the most fundamental issue to be addressed by
courts and commentators is whether the market access doctrine can
improve antitrust and intellectual property law liability analysis
under circumstances where the output/profitability test would run the
risk of producing erroneous decisions, but that nonetheless would
serve the normative goals of promoting consumer welfare.
188 To
answer this question, one must address an issue that courts heretofore
186. See infra Part IV.
187. Another element of uncertainty plagues the output/profitability test. The elimination
of intratype competition through denying access is often accompanied by new costs generated by
the exclusive protection of intertype competition. See Grimes, Dynamic Analysis, supra note 48,
at 105; Grimes, Brand Marketing, supra note 48, at 111-19. However, this type of 'cost-cost'
analysis is extremely expensive and difficult to conduct. In order to analyze alternative scenarios
in which markets spur innovation, factfinders must be prepared to consider not only the costs
that may be posed by intratype competition, but also the many other secondary effects that the
exclusive protection of intertype competition may produce, including, for example, costs that
arise other than those that specifically affect the incumbent market actor such as costs stemming
from decreased functional advantages of similar goods, changes in the desirability of new
commodities, commodities of competitors, and so forth. A comprehensive analysis of this sort is
not only dauntingly complex to conduct, but also is subject to considerable manipulation by
parties who strategically highlight only those ancillary effects that support their preferred
outcome.
188. On the axiomatic nature of competition policy paradigms, see Adrian Kuenzler,
Economic Content of Competition Law: The Point of Regulating Preferences, in THE GOALS OF
COMPETITION LAW 182 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).
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have failed to confront with sufficient clarity: what precisely are the
theoretical foundations of the market access doctrine?
It is well recognized that the competitor test of
output/profitability analysis can be grounded firmly in economic
theory.189 By measuring the marginal costs and benefits posed by
producing different quantities, the output/profitability test appears to
ensure that producers and inventors face legal incentives to maximize
consumer welfare. The market access doctrine, on the other hand,
purports to effectuate the longer term expectations in new innovation
of consumers but generally fails to explain how those expectations are
to be ascertained or, indeed, why they should be vested with
adjudicatory significance.
Judge Michael Boudin's concurrence in Lotus demonstrates
this problematic indeterminacy. According to Judge Boudin:
If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern [i.e. the menu command hierarchy],
users who have learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own
macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist who has learned the QWERTY
keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a monopoly on the production of
such a keyboard. Apparently, for a period Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in the
market that it has represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet
commands. So long as Lotus is the superior spreadsheet-either in quality or in
price-there may be nothing wrong with this advantage.
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why customers who have
learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should remain captives of Lotus
because of an investment in learning made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus
has already reaped a substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland
program is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new advance, and to
reward Borland in turn for making a better product. If Borland has not made a
better product, then customers will remain with Lotus anyway.
Thus, for me the question is not whether Borland should prevail, but on what
basis. [. . ]190
Of this inquiry, the first factor-whether the establishment of a
platform (here, a particular command hierarchy for spreadsheets)
deserves protection so as to provide the necessary incentives to spur
innovation-appears intuitively to be the subject of consistent
consideration by advocates of the output/profitability framework. The
second factor-that full proprietary protection of such a platform could
diminish consumer welfare rather than increase it-often does not
seem to be an item of contemplation by apologists of the
output/profitability account, even though it may be a relevant concern
of consumers. Such concerns typically only become relevant within
189. See Posner, supra note 13, at 934; BORK, supra note 15, at 116-17.




the conventional output/profitability framework in cases where the
costs of contractual or intellectual property protection for one reason
or another has become so salient to courts that they would prefer
competitors to appropriate some of the value of the platform and
would thus contemplate providing market access.191 Hence, omission
of the second factor generally appears to represent the ordinary
expert's rather than the ordinary consumer's preferences.19
2
These observations entail that either the market access
doctrine must devolve in practice into an ordinary
(output/profitability) analysis, as Lotus and other market access
opinions demonstrate, or that the area occupied by the market access
doctrine is, as critics contend, so ambiguous and imprecise as to
render continued adherence to the test untenable.
2. A Three-Step Inquiry into Evaluating Market Access
As implicated in Judge Boudin's concurrence, a fair use
analysis-or any other conventional doctrinal lever-could easily
accommodate the relevant innovation policy issues. Under a distinct
market access test, courts would be more flexible to engage in a
fact-specific analysis that would allow them to assess the relevant
issues as opposed to making categorical judgments about the
protectability of a particular platform. To make market access
analysis more tractable, the market access test would have to follow a
three-part investigation.193
First, courts would have to consider whether the inventor,
through first mover advantages, has reaped a sufficient reward such
that contractual or intellectual property rights protection would no
longer be required to facilitate innovation. In nearly all innovation
markets where platform goods have a dominant market share, this
consideration would weigh in favor of granting market access. This
requirement is firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence; for
instance, in Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
the Court explained,
191. See infra notes 256-68 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 122-61 and accompanying text.
193. Id.; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Sony
Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1079-81 (1996) (arguing in favor of a concept that
grants access to "radical improvers"); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1111-12 (1989) (arguing in favor of a concept of "transformative use"); Philip J.
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534,
606-07 (2003) (arguing in favor of a "competitive platforms model" that can incorporate such a
three-step test).
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[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To this end, copyright assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.19 4
The Court's statement that "copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression" precludes courts from finding that all
expression is necessarily protectable. In Kodak, the Supreme Court
rejected Kodak's position that although ISOs put substantial efforts
into the service market for Kodak printers, they were free riding on
Kodak's investments. In the Court's view, Kodak's tying practice
resulted in the creation of entry barriers. As the Court stated,
"[Kodak's] understanding of free-riding has no support in our case law.
To the contrary . . . , one.of the evils proscribed by antitrust laws is the
creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to
enter two markets simultaneously."195 In conformity with the first
prong of the market access test, the Court supported free riding as a
legitimate business reason for exclusionary conduct only "because
without restrictions a manufacturer would not be able to induce
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
capital and labor necessary to distribute the product."196 The Supreme
Court's notion in Kodak that access should otherwise be granted
conforms to the belief that in an advanced market economy, nearly
every firm's sales benefit from complementary products made by other
firms. Computer software is useless unless someone makes hardware.
Hardware manufacturers sell more computers because software
developers create applications. Consumers buy more software because
hardware manufacturers produce faster computers, and so on. Rather
than viewing the software developer as free riding on the hardware
manufacturer, an increase in the hardware manufacturer's sales
might be the result of the software developer's investment. Depending
on the vantage point taken, the software developer's production may
increase the demand, and incentive, for the amount of raw material
(hardware) produced rather than simply free riding on it. Today,
many goods and services, not just new and complex equipment, are
able (and are, in fact, in need) of complementing each other. This may
increase, rather than diminish, manufacturers' incentives to invest in
additional resources in production, and may increase, rather than
194. 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (citation omitted).
195. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992). But see
Carlton, supra note 112, at 112 ("With ex ante competition combined with reputations and
sophisticated buyers, or simply with ex ante competition alone, the [interbrand] competition
should provide enough protection so that the antitrust laws are likely to do only harm when they
are used to intervene in a market.").
196. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 485.
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diminish, both the output of producers, suppliers and the benefits to
consumers. Courts, under the first prong of the market access test,
must thus inquire whether the original platform should be foreclosed
from contractual or intellectual property rights protection to enable
competitors to build upon a sufficient stock of raw material.
Second, courts should assess whether competitors are able to
challenge the proprietary platform's position in the market without
the possibility of granting access. This requirement simply assures
that the provision of market access and compulsory sharing will not
lead to remedies "costly to the entire market."197 In this vein, Phillip
Areeda famously noted that that sharing should be compulsory only
"when it is both critical to the plaintiffs competitive vitality and the
plaintiff is essential for competition in the marketplace. 'Critical to
the plaintiffs competitive vitality' means that the plaintiff cannot
compete effectively without it and that duplication or practical
alternatives are not available."198 As a result,
[n]o one should be forced to deal unless doing so is likely substantially to improve
competition in the marketplace by reducing price or by increasing output or
innovation. Such an improvement is unlikely (a) when it would chill desirable
activity; (b) the plaintiff is not an actual or potential competitor; (c) when the
plaintiff merely substitutes itself for the monopolist or shares the monopolist's
gains; or (d) when the monopolist already has the usual privilege of charging the
monopoly price for its resources . .. Even when all these conditions are satisfied,
denial of access is never per se unlawful; legitimate business purpose always saves
the defendant.199
In conformity with those requirements, the court's underlying
supposition in Microsoft was that because Microsoft dominated its
network for computer operating systems, which in turn dominated the
market that it served, highly creative innovations were unable to find
a market as there was no easy way to make them compatible with the
rest of the network.200 Notwithstanding the possibility that over time
an alternative operating system might have supplanted Windows or
forced it to provide interoperability information, without reasonable
access for rivals' server software the resulting entrenchment directed
innovation along a specific path and gravely constrained the
innovations of others.201 Hence, market access rules must no longer be
seen to require a dominant firm to assist rivals by providing them
197. Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and
Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994).
198. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1989).
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
201. Hovenkamp, supra note 174, at 1639-41.
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with interoperability information with respect to the platform good it
has developed, but rather must be viewed as an antitrust equivalent
to enabling cumulative innovation in path-dependent settings where a
rival's superior or more cost-effective innovation is given a chance to
compete on the rest of that dominant network. Under these
assumptions, market access may enhance the competitiveness -and
quality of platforms so that all parties capable of competing are given
a level playing field that is unconstrained by a dominant firm's self-
dealing.202
Third, courts should determine whether competitors seeking to
benefit from market access will make use of it to facilitate the
introduction of a new (differentiated, rival) good rather than merely in
order to copy the initial invention.203 This requirement is explicit in
nearly all market access cases. For example, prior to its fair use
analysis, the Sega court noted,
Accolade did not attempt to 'scoop' Sega's release of any particular game or games,
but sought only to become a legitimate competitor in the field of Genesis-
compatible video games. Within that market, it is the characteristics of the game
program as experienced by the user that determine the program's commercial
success.2 04
In Connectix, although the district court found that "a [market]
substitution [of Connectix's Virtual Game Station for Sony
PlayStation consoles] occurs," the Ninth Circuit Court declared,
"because the Virtual Game Station is transformative, and does not
merely supplant the PlayStation console, the Virtual Game Station is
a legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and
Sony-licensed games can be played."205
Applying a three-step inquiry in this manner would allow
courts to place the market access doctrine on a more solid conceptual
foundation. Courts would finally be in a position to recognize that
market access and output/profitability represent different items of
contemplation by consumers, because consumers describe and
understand the content of the market access sphere of antitrust and
intellectual property law liability differently from that contained
202. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. EcON. REV. 940, 941-43 (1986); Stan J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. EcON. & ORG.
206 (1995).
203. Areeda, supra note 191, at 851-52. Nothing in this Article contradicts these well-
accepted suppositions. Particularly, Areeda's formulation includes the possibility of providing
market access if such access is likely to spur innovation (as opposed to merely reducing price or
increasing output).
204. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992).
205. Sony Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2000).
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within the output/profitability standard. As will be shown in the next
Part, the market access test represents sufficiently substantial,
analytically separate substance that can be placed within that sphere.
IV. A REINVIGORATED ROLE FOR MARKET ACCESS
Legal scholars focusing on the output/profitability view of
antitrust and intellectual property law have relied on a notion of
progress in which individuals are assumed to process available
information in order to maximize utility over time. By contrast,
scholars examining human judgment and decision making have
observed that individuals regularly process information and make
decisions in manners that deviate from the conventional expected-
utility maximizing hypothesis. Moreover, these deviations from
rational utility maximization are consistent and predictable, and as
such offer the potential to significantly enhance the descriptiveness of
the market access account, while stopping short of the radical
indeterminacy implied by opponents of it.
This Part argues that research from cognitive psychology
provides a better understanding as to why courts to date have been
hesitant to explicitly embrace market access considerations in
antitrust and intellectual property law litigation. The conventional
approach to output/profitability analysis in many respects is based on
a notion of progress that is narrower and less normatively imbued
than the understanding typically held by ordinary consumers.
Contrary to this notion, as research from the cognitive sciences
demonstrates, the market access doctrine has the potential to provide
an important avenue for the expression of consumer preferences
associated with innovation and progress that might otherwise be
ignored within antitrust and intellectual property law. The proposed
market access test would therefore advance the promotion of
innovation and progress without entailing the same perceived degree
of vagueness that heretofore has been associated with the market
access doctrine. In that way, the market access doctrine might
eventually present an independent reality that cannot simply be
written off as the result of mere historical accident or good fortune on
the part of market access courts.
A. Why A Distinct Market Access Paradigm Fails to Emerge
In contrast to the picture emerging from scholars adhering to
the conventional output/profitability view of promoting progress, a
number of studies have demonstrated that the reason for industry's
choice to obtain maximum proprietary protection is found in its
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institutional culture and practices, or in the "psychology" of the
companies, CEOs, and market actors involved. For instance, in
Harvard Business School Professor Clayton M. Christensen's study,
The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms
to Fail, Christensen suggests that leading companies may often
succeed in putting into effect "sustaining innovations" but frequently
fail to keep pace with disruptive, "radical innovations" that displace
current business models by making simpler, more convenient, and
cheaper products that attract new consumers.206  In essence,
Christensen claims that preexisting investments in employees,
facilities, and materials often are related to a particular technology,
allowing large firms to provide services to an existing customer base
and to raise their share prices by increasing growth.207 As a result,
"[s]ustaining innovations improve existing products and involve
incremental [innovation]. "208 Disruptive technologies, by contrast,
lead to speculative markets in the future, involve less interest and
greater threat, and thus endanger existing business models and
management practices of established firms.209 In an important series
of examples, Christensen demonstrates that new market entrants are
frequently more flexible and remain unburdened "by human and
physical assets geared to highly specific production . . . ," and that
they "have every economic incentive to overturn the existing order"
and thus "little to lose" in promoting disruptive innovation.210
The tense but inescapable relationship between institutional
inertia and new innovation also is the theme of law professor Michael
Carrier's startling and fascinating study of dozens of CEOs, company
founders, and vice presidents from technology companies, the music
recording industry, and venture capital firms. Carrier points out that
established market actors often are in denial about the potentially
transformative capacity of new technologies and remain mired in the
legal, economic, and ideological detritus of the past rather than ceding
existing property rights to independent innovators. One clear
indication of this observation, according to Carrier's study, is the
established market actors' "focus on the short term over the long term"
206. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 15, 39 (1997); see also CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E.
RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR'S SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 31-32,
34 (2003).
207. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 206, at 98, 132-33; JAMES M. UTTERBACK, MASTERING THE
DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION 163 (1996).
208. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 206, at 39-40.
209. Id. at 98-99, 147.
210. UTTERBACK, supra note 207, at 161, 164.
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to the extent that "all rewards go to the short term."2 1 1 Such an
emphasis on immediate, short-term gains over more distant, long-
term benefits is arguably rooted in the typical company officers' focus
on "bonuses based on how they did compared to last year" and the
"organizational and institutional incentives to try to recreate last
year's business going forward."212 That is, most established companies
try to produce always more rather than less revenue because
executives concentrate "on the short term-their stock, their cash
compensation year after year, their own personal [profit and loss
statement]-and not the greater good of the company."21
3
1. (Non-)Availability and Spillover Effects
In line with those observations, leading proponents of the
behavioral approach to human behavior and decision making have
demonstrated that certain psychological tendencies might lead
individuals and groups to behave systematically in this way: Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, in their canonical treatment of the
availability heuristic, for instance point out that "[1]ife-long experience
has taught us that . . . likely occurrences are easier to imagine than
unlikely ones . . . ."214 In the realm of markets, this heuristic can have
pernicious effects. The traditional output/profitability view appears to
reflect and perhaps exacerbate such tendencies by focusing
asymmetrically on the harm that might come from free riding,
sharing, copying, or imitating rather than on the positive spillover
effects such practices might entail or the benefits that might follow
from limiting contractual or intellectual property rights, and from
providing market access for competitors. This view, however, depends
on a selective perception of the economic and social scientific
consequences of open innovation. While much has been made of the
free riding hypothesis as a catalyst for underinvestment in the
prevention of copying, free riding can just as easily lead to
overinvestment in the prevention of sharing or imitating. In the event
of some underrated benefits, the provision of market access therefore
might allow innovators and firms to overcome the problem of non-
availability.
211. Carrier, supra note 173, at 928.
212. Id. at 928-29.
213. Id. at 929.
214. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973).
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Consider the case of positive spillover effects. As the literature
on commons-based modes of production has shown,215  the
management of ordinary goods and resources can evolve into
shareable infrastructure216 and can generate significant positive
externalitieS217 in that such management may facilitate productive
behaviors by third parties.218 Even if the third-party effects are often
incidental, the occurrence of spillovers may render the provision of
access socially desirable and internalization by way of exclusive
property rights inefficient.219 Moreover, such internalization is often
215. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: How
COOPERATION TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST (2011) [hereinafter BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND
THE LEVIATHAN]; YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007) [hereinafter BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (2005);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX:
MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2009); STEVEN WEBER, THE
SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2005); VON HIPPEL, supra note 172, at 1; Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole,
Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002);
216. Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 43
(2008).
217. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 37-38 (2013).
218. The ability of market regulators and courts to grasp these benefits may hinge on a
number of actors: as Professors Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf emphasize in the
context of file-sharing, "[t]he role of complements makes it necessary to adopt a broad view of
markets when considering the impact of [sharing] on the creative industries. Unfortunately, the
popular press-and a good number of policy experts-often [assess the value of access] by looking
at a single product market." Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File Sharing and
Copyright, 10 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 19, 46 (2010). Analyzing trends in CD sales, for
example, they conclude that:
... piracy has wreaked havoc on the music business. This view confuses value
creation and value capture. Record companies may find it more difficult to profitably
sell CDs, but the broader industry [by streaming more record singles, creating
revenues from selling shows, videos, live concerts and other complements] is in a far
better position. In fact, it is easy to make an argument that the business has grown
considerably [by providing market access].
Id.
A further reason why a drop in industry revenues might not hurt creative production is that
authors, writers, musicians, and innovators often take pleasure from creating, from enjoying a
flexible lifestyle, and from lacking an immediate hierarchical employment structure. The
remuneration of creative talent often takes a non-monetary form, consisting of fame, admiration,
social status and so on, suggesting that a diminution in monetary incentives might not always
result in a reduced effect on the quantity and quality of creative output. Id. at 48. Finally,
because many of today's goods and services are, by their nature, neither rival nor nonrival but
rather their degree of rivalry may vary across time, among users, and across contexts, many
goods and services must now be viewed as being able to become infrastructure to the extent that
they exhibit platform features based on widespread social use and reliance. RICHARD CORNES &
TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (2d ed.
1996).
219. CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 218, at 37.
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"irrelevant" in the sense that, "whether or not [spillovers] are
internalized by actors, the actors would not change their actions."22
0
This point places a "significant limit on . .. arguments about free
riding and speculative diminution of incentives to invest" because
''capturing value realized by others-through monetary returns or
otherwise is [often no longer] necessary to support incentives to
innovate . . . ."221 Spillover effects often complicate and confound
traditional economic analysis of the costs and benefits of granting
property rights, and present fundamental challenges to the way that
individuals and regulators think about the economy, particularly
because vivid examples of spillover effects often cease to come to mind.
The reasons for such unavailability are that spillovers, as Brett M.
Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley observed, often are temporal:
Alexander Graham Bell got some benefit from his invention of the telephone, but
he doesn't anymore. The companies he founded continue to make money from the
telephone, but they also have competitors who make money from the invention as
well, and users of the telephone benefit in countless ways from which they do not
fully pay.
2 22
Others are geographic, in several different ways: "[a]n
innovation contributes to a local economy, employing people who
spend their money locally."2 2 3 Or "[p]opulation density is strongly
positively related to local innovation-people are more inventive when
they are around other inventive people. Ideas may travel further or
more quickly than they would if confined to market transactions."
2 24
Again, other spillovers are inter-industry: "[w]ork done in one field,
such as defense or space science, may have benefits in seemingly
unrelated fields such as materials science. The inventor may have no
interest in or even awareness of the benefits her idea has in these
unrelated fields [but she may benefit through increased visibility and
more demand]. "225 And many spillovers are non-appropriable:
[d]uring the period Bell held patents on the telephone, he did not recognize, much
less capture, the full benefits of his inventions. People paid him a certain amount
for telephones, but as others bought phones, the value of the phones to the earlier
purchasers went up, and Bell did not capture any of that new value. Nor did he
capture the benefits to those who saved money or lives because their neighbors
220. FRISCHMANN, supra note 217, at 15.
221. Id. at 39.
222. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 260
(2007).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 260-61.
225. Id. at 261.
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could call the police to report a crime, or any of countless other benefits the
telephone provided to society.22 6
In these and other examples, it is often easier to recall the
harms of free riding rather than to imagine the vague benefits of
sharing, particularly because the former have been highly theorized
and discussed in public, whereas the latter have remained largely
obscure in legal and economic theory.
2. Decision Making Under Uncertainty
The behavioral research further indicates that there are
several important reasons to believe that human perception and
decision making under uncertainty are generally skewed against the
promotion of innovation and progress. Underlying this indication is
the fact that both the decisions of market actors and regulators often
are framed as a choice between avoidance of a relatively sure,
immediate, or very near-term loss of money (i.e., the costs resulting
from diminished private profits when market access is granted) and
avoidance of a relatively unsure, non-immediate loss in individual and
social welfare (i.e., the loss resulting from diminished private and
social gains due to foregone spillover effects when market access is
denied). In particular, this holds true when decision makers are asked
to assess the costs and benefits of new innovations: it is often easier
for us to perceive exactly the harmful side of creative destruction than
it is to grasp its constructive side.2 2 7
The way in which the parties to United States v. Microsoft
assessed the effects of innovation colorfully illustrates this point.228
Today, in the view of an overwhelming number of distinguished
226. Id. On the supply side, spillovers are uncaptured benefits that could be internalized
to increase incentives to invest, and on the demand side, spillovers reflect unobserved, lost
signals of consumer demand that fail to guide investment and management decisions. From the
vantage point of a property rights theorist, we should thus eliminate spillovers.
227. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1976). See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 268-69 (1979), for a thorough study of this phenomenon. Kahneman and
Tversky concluded that people generally overweigh outcomes that are considered certain relative
to outcomes that are merely probable. One implication of their observation is that, when faced
with choosing between the receipt of a sure gain and an unsure gain, both with identical
expected value, people often choose to receive the sure gain. Conversely, when they have to make
a choice between the avoidance of a sure loss and the avoidance of an unsure loss of identical
expected magnitude, they will often decide to avoid the sure loss. Since the level of uncertainty
about future losses due to innovative activity often is great, the bias in favor of avoiding sure
losses-and thus against engaging in innovative activity-over unsure losses-and thus in favor
of less innovative activity-likely will be robust in the intellectual property and antitrust
regulatory context.
228. See EVANS, FISHER, RUBINFELD & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 1, 4.
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commentators, Microsoft's conduct consisted of quite a few actions to
conserve and proliferate entry barriers into the PC operating system
market,229 including, among other things: tying its browser to the
operating system; its exclusion of browser competitors from the most
efficient distribution channels; placing restrictive agreements on
OEMs by forcing them to utilize only Microsoft's browser; and
imposing agreements on Internet service and content providers to
exclude competing browsers.230 As noted above, the relevant concerns
were so complex and difficult to determine with certainty that
competition authorities could only guess what might have been the
chain of effects set off by Microsoft's conduct. Future gains or losses in
innovation typically are uncertain, both at the level of determining
whether an innovation's perceived opportunities will be beneficial or
detrimental to the economy and to consumers and with respect to the
question of whether available regulatory tools will in fact prevent such
harm.231 It is, for instance, exceedingly difficult to predict exactly
what effect anticompetitive restraints will have on the magnitude and
speed of the development of platform competition, on the delivery of
complementary goods, the growth of network effects, and, perhaps
most hypothetically of all, on how much better off consumers will be as
a result of such innovation.232 By contrast, it is often fairly certain
that at least some opportunity costs, in the form of lower average
revenue per unit, will be incurred as a result of less proprietary
protection.233 In rejecting a consumer claim against Microsoft for the
identical restraints on innovation that the District Court for the
District of Columbia banned, one appellate court held:
[Ilt would be entirely speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial
proceeding to create in hindsight a technological universe that never came into
existence.. . . It would be even more speculative to determine the relevant benefits
and detriments that non-Microsoft products would have brought to the market and
the relative monetary value . . . to a diffuse population of end users.
2 3 4
229. Id. at 4. But see Hovenkamp, supra note 174, at 1630-43; First, supra note 5, at
1369, 1396-97.
230. EVANS, FISHER, RUBINFELD, & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 3.
231. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 251 (2012) ("Restraints on innovation are
unquestionably a concern of antitrust policy, but enforcement has never been as strong as it
should be. On the one hand, it seems clear that the social losses that result from innovation
restraints are immense. On the other, identifying anticompetitive innovation restraints has
proven to be difficult, and development of suitable remedies even more problematic.").
232. Id. at 249, 251.
233. Id. at 245.
234. Id. at 253. Whether the EU Microsoft decision must be seen as adopting a long-term
view or may be seen as the result of a "debiasing mechanism" in antitrust law that in doubt
provides for market access rather than against it, remains an open question. Jon D. Hanson &
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Underlying this statement is the additional difficulty that the
conventional output/profitability models generally involve a balancing
of costs and benefits of a single parameter determining one single
pathway of the economy, and thus often reach a limit as a guide to
real world settings containing multiple interactions among costs and
benefits, multiple pathways of multiple parameters, and multiple
economic actors with heterogeneous preferences.235 The point is not
that efforts to assess the costs and benefits of innovation based on
these models are necessarily imprudent or misguided, but rather that
it is exceedingly difficult to predict with precision the extent of a lost
invention to consumers, as compared to any price increase or loss of
profit on existing products that results from prohibiting a particular
practice because it is viewed as an anticompetitive restraint. The
difficulty is underscored by the psychological predisposition to
emphasize the perceived, certain losses in productivity over possible
anticompetitive effects on innovation.
Studies in cognitive psychological research further show that
people value the avoidance of instantaneous or almost instantaneous
losses far more strongly than the avoidance of remote losses, even in
the not-too-distant future.236 In the market regulatory context, losses
in innovative and creative activity are typically more distant than are
foregone industrial profits or job losses. Years can pass between a
software manufacturer's provision of interoperability information to
his rivals and the corresponding realization of network effects as a
result of widespread use of applications that will grow the network's
output in terms of increased economies of scale in consumption.237
Likewise, a standard printer's platform characteristics can only be
realized if the manufacturer permits every qualifying independent
service organization to provide maintenance and repair for its product,
which depends on the possibility of competition in the aftermarket
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1552 (1998); see also Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral
Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527 (2011).
235. See Rafael Nlfiez & Kensy Cooperrider, The Tangle of Space and Time in Human
Cognition, 17 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 220 (2013).
236. George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence
and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573 (1992); Marjorie K. Shelley, Gain/Loss Asymmetry in
Risky Intertemporal Choice, 59 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1994); see also
Charles Vlek & Gideon Keren, Behavioral Decision Theory and Environmental Risk
Management: Assessment and Resolution of Four "Survival" Dilemmas, 80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
249 (1992).
237. In the United States, for instance, it took more than half a century for the telephone
system to evolve into a single network. See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2 (2010).
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among many types of suppliers.238 It may take us years to understand
the full implications of intratype competition where demand by one
group of consumers affects demand by another23
9 and its attendant
losses in innovative activity if such competition is suppressed. On the
other hand, no one doubts that the imposition of a duty to deal or to
provide market access in such cases will result in immediate economic
costs for the manufacturer.240 This occurs through more intense
competition and a constrained capacity to run away with all of the
private gains once it is no longer in a position to do so (although the
evidence suggests that those costs are often significantly overstated by
market access opponents, at least in the long run).
24 1
To be sure, these dynamics do not tell us whether a market
regulatory policy based on weak (contractual and intellectual)
property rights is more or less desirable than an approach which aims
at internalizing maximum private rewards. The answer depends on
whether the problem of overprotecting against the immediate costs of
providing access to a market actor's production output, i.e., when
those costs are cognitively readily available, is greater or lesser than
the problem of under-protecting against the costs of foregone
cumulative innovation that are not cognitively available. A mounting
body of literature in psychology suggests, however, that in the market
regulatory context agencies and courts probably should be more
concerned with the latter problem. According to what are known as
"dual-process theories of thinking," numerical representations of risks
often lack compelling meaning to individuals.242 As a result, the
significance of what stands behind statistical information frequently
will be underrepresented in their decision making and beliefs.
243
Accordingly, much of the debate within antitrust and
intellectual property law scholarship juxtaposes the relatively certain,
immediate monetary costs of reduced monopolization, income
238. For example, to the extent that the installed base of existing users of a particular
type of computer becomes larger, software becomes more profitable to write and cheaper to
purchase.
239. One example is network television, which is free to viewers but costly to advertisers
who are willing to pay more when the viewing audience is larger.
240 See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20
YALE J. REG. 325 (2003). Most manufacturers that offer complementary goods or services such as
printers and ink jets or razors and razor blades might increase attractiveness of their product to
developers and users and eventually the number of consumers by charging a lower price for their
primary product, thus increasing attractiveness of their product to developers, users, and
consumers on the secondary market.
241. Id.
242. Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, BEHAV. FOUND. POL'Y, 126,
483 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2011).
243. Id.; George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-68,
270 (2001); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1333 (2007).
5272017]
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
reductions, and decreased incentive effects and the relatively
uncertain, more distant welfare effects from undeveloped cumulative
innovations that would have manifested in qualitatively (i.e.,
nonmonetary) improved or innovative new products. At stake in this
characterization of the economy is how agencies and courts are made
to understand the nature of competition, innovation, and the economy
itself. The framing of economic policy issues as reflecting purely
quantifiable trade-offs between numerical values (money) on the one
hand and non-numerical dynamic innovation on the other has
implications for cognitive inferences or heuristics beyond well-
established conceptions of deadweight losses, efficiency, and economic
rationality. In order to assess the competitive effects of innovation
based on the output/profitability test's intertype competition
framework, decision makers must create trade-offs and reduce the
uncertain and remote costs and benefits in innovation to numbers. In
this process, the distant, uncertain, and nonmonetary benefits of
innovation often get lost, not just because they cannot be manifested
solely-or at all-in quantifiable differences in the way that cost
economies in product manufacturing can be stated, but also, and
perhaps primarily, because innovation in the form of qualitatively
improved or new products, in the form of technical advances, or in the
form of the cost-control function of competition as such are simply
difficult for individuals to project.
B. Collaborative Consumption Preferences
The strength of the case for the sort of economy in which
antitrust and intellectual property laws are called upon to make
market access thinking possible, however, depends on the assumed
content of consumer preferences, and on an evaluation of those
preferences within their specific market regulatory contexts. Though
proponents of the output/profitability view are inclined to view
preferences for less proprietary forms of production and distribution
as particularly unreliable bases for consumer decision making, such
preferences on close examination seem to mirror coherent, well
grounded consumer vantage points, and are reminiscent of a number
of influences that have united the consumer and the market in the
modern information society.244
In a particularly vivid illustration of this stance, Rachel
Botsman and Roo Rogers document in their book, What's Mine Is
Yours-The Rise of Collaborative Consumption, the rapidly
244. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2007).
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proliferating concept and practice of sharing resources-human and
physical assets, in everything from bicycles and automobiles to
accommodation, foodstuff, offices, household articles, and even time
and knowledge.245 Individuals and organizations, as these authors
document, have begun to distribute, split, and re-use unexploited
excess capacity in goods and services. Some of the business icons of
this new economy include: Uber, Lyft, ZipCar, CityCarShare, and
Relay Rides, with the help of which individuals can leverage the
unused capacity of their cars to members; MechanicalTurk, which
provides developers of human intelligence tasks with crowdsourced
solutions; Ushahidi, which allows individuals to donate small slivers
of time to perform simple tasks that others need doing; or Airbnb,
which makes it possible for people to share their homes for a fee.
Similarly, businesses that share information about product design and
distribution and offer independent maintenance and repair services
ostensibly have seen an upsurge in demand. Customers of their
services arguably seek to "unlock" the unused value of ready-made
durable commodities.2 4 6 Spurred presumably by increasing consumer
awareness with respect to the value of access over ownership, new
forms of "distributed capitalism" have expanded from a
little-understood fringe element to one of the fastest growing segments
of American markets. In 2013, they generated an estimated $3.5
billion in revenue247 and forecasts predicted a future market potential
245. RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE Is YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 1 (2010).
246. See, e.g., BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN, supra note 215, at 214-16;
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 215, at 59-90; DAREN C. BRABHAM,
CROWDSOURCING 1 (2013); BRE'T KING, BANK 3.0: WHY BANKING IS No LONGER SOMEWHERE
YOU Go BUT SOMETHING YOU DO (2012); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 117-249 (2001); Nia Hamm, How Collaborative
Consumption Is Helping Small Businesses Grow, CNBC (July 13, 2014, 7:04 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101822531 [https://perma.cc/4YK4-D9HQ]; Xavier de Lecaros Aquise,
The Rise of Collaborative Consumption and the Experience Economy, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2014,
5:42 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/Jan/03/collaborative-consumption-
experience-economy-startups [https://perma.cc/2ZRP-J7P8]; Airbnb, Snapgoods and 12 More
Pioneers of the 'Share Economy'-In Photos: Airbnb, Snapgoods and 12 More Pioneers Of The
'Share Economy', FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/pictures/eeji45emgkhlairbnb-snapgoods-and-
12-more-pioneers-of-the-share-economy/ [https://perma.cclL8DU-FGSB] (last visited Feb. 18,
2017).
247. European Commission, Report by Business Innovation Observatory on The Sharing
Economy: Accessibility Based Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Markets, Ref. Ares (2015) 4645909
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/querylindex.do?queryText=the+sharing+economy
%3A+accessibility+based+business+models&summary=summary&more-options-source=global&
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of $110 billion in the United States alone.2 4 8 Meanwhile, the size of
the new digital economy has grown far beyond these numbers to the
point that collaborative consumption is more than just a localized
phenomenon that results in substantial cost savings and earnings for
individuals and enterprises. Indeed, entrepreneurs with a broader
vision contend that for producers, this economy is about something
bigger than couch-surfing, bicycle sharing, or tool libraries.
Collaborative consumption, they contend, prescribes a new modus
operandi which will disrupt the "hyper-individualized" and "hyper-
materialistic" assumptions of our present-day consumer culture.249
Buoyed by their successes, they posit that peer-to-peer collaboration
constitutes the foundation of a new social contract in which sharing
acts as a catalyst for an economic transformation apt to meet the
profound social and cultural challenges of the twenty-first century.250
In this view, collaborative consumption gravitates around the
"maximum utilization of assets through efficient [. . .] redistribution
and shared access."251 It does not invariably rest on a principle of
sharing goods and services such as cars, bicycles, labor, talent, and so
forth by any strict meaning, nor is it limited or tied to the success of
digital technologies which make such sharing easier. Instead, the
emphasis of collaborative consumption is on a broadened sharing
spectrum that includes the exploitation of complementaries, unused
excess capacities, and network effects of non-material or intangible
qualities of all sorts of everyday consumer goods that enhance an
individual's well-being in terms of capability.
The significance of these developments for contemporary
market regulatory doctrine becomes evident if we contemplate for a
moment the effects that strong proprietary forms of production and
distribution have had on the economy. Before the advent of the
industrial revolution, consumers used to exchange information
directly with craftsmen and were able to describe precisely what they
desired and how they wanted it to be done. With the emergence of
economies of scale and scope, however, producers came to conclude-
often quite rightly so-that mass production was an important way to
248. Id.
249. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, TRUE WEALTH: HOW AND WHY MILLIONS OF
AMERICANS ARE CREATING A TIME-RICH, ECOLOGICALLY LIGHT, SMALL-SCALE,
HIGH-SATISFACTION ECONOMY (2d ed. 2011) (previously published as PLENITUDE).
250. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 43
(2001).
251. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, CO.EXIST (Nov.




lower costs by producing larger volumes on the same pattern.
2 52 This
insight gave rise to a clash between the accommodation of every
consumer's desires and the goal of reducing costs by diminishing the
variety of styles produced. In response to the ensuing expansion of
strong proprietary forms of trade, markets have generally produced a
less abundant variety of goods and services because new methods of
mass production held back the fabrication and distribution of goods
and services for which there was scant or no mass demand at all. In
this way, scale economies in production-while lowering
costs-restricted the range of goods produced, and restricted even
further the variety of goods widely distributed.253
Against this background we must recognize that the consumer
behavior observed by Botsman and Rogers calls for a shift in market
regulatory policy from ever more (contractual and intellectual)
property protection to an improved understanding of sharing and
augmenting the raw material we are presumed to create in our society
and economy. Indeed, from its outset, we must understand
collaborative consumption as an attempt by consumers to reclaim
some public space within the market, a space that has been under
challenge by an increasing trend toward propertization and
innovation-impeding power dynamics. As economist William Hutt
wrote quite some time ago "we believe that the achievements of the
productive system can be measured only in terms of the extent to
which they represent a response to the consumers' will."
2 54 The
consumer, as Hutt writes:
[I]s usually also a producer. But as a producer he is the servant of the community.
He must apply himself and the property and equipment he possesses to producing
what the community wants or he will obtain nothing in the form of claims on
others in return. As a consumer, he commands other producers. The individual's
twofold relationship to society, that of sovereign and subject is best exemplified in
his roles of consumer and producer respectively. These terms refer simply to
different aspects of each member of society. As a 'consumer,' each directs. As a
'producer,' each obeys.
2 55
Hutt makes evident that our modern understanding of capitalism
tends to ignore its ancestors by dismissing preferences for less
proprietary forms of production and distribution, and asserts that less
proprietary forms of trade interfere with the unequivocally normative
252. Nicholas Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4
(1990).
253. Kevin Lancaster, The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey, 9 MARKETING SCl.
189, 192 (1990).
254. WLLIAM H. Hutt, ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC: A STUDY OF COMPETITION AND
OPINION 258 (2d ed. 1990).
255. Id. at 257-58.
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goals of maximizing product manufacturers' immediate, tangible
outputs.
Yet if production is judged based on placing consumers first,
market actors should in many instances be free to access a product
manufacturer's output and to distribute, reuse, and build upon them
to fit consumers' needs and desires, and should be free to share their
own produce, because such sharing constitutes the basis of a
prosperous and competitive economy. As commons-based models of
innovation and growth exemplify, consumers appear to be expressing
preferences not merely for the goods that they wish to acquire, but
also for the conditions and values that they hope to encourage in the
economy's productive sphere. Most notably, consumer concerns seem
premised on a recognition that consumers, as users and citizens, care
about what kind of economy and society they are allowed to inhabit.256
To that extent, rejecting consumer preferences outright for less
proprietary forms of production and distribution seems unwarranted
today. Instead, in keeping with the premises of liberal market
societies, the default reaction of the government to allegedly dubious
consumer preferences for less proprietary forms of production and
distribution should not be to suppress them, but rather to expose them
to scrutiny and counterargument.
C. Process Preferences
In conformity with these observations, there is extensive
evidence that individuals have preferences for consuming goods and
activities themselves, that is, they have preferences for goods and
activities that do not depend for their full value upon how much the
good or activity is worth in the market or even on their usefulness of
the goods or activities in question. Software developers who feel part
of a technical community and who are committed to improving their
programming skills to facilitate their work through better software
illustrate this point in a startling manner.257 They consume software
and at the same time develop and modify it for their own use.2 5 8 The
desire of the consumer, in such cases, is to pursue a shared goal such
as the improvement and customization of goods at hand while
enjoying an intrinsically satisfying activity. This idea pertains to the
256. Rolf H. Weber, Consumer Autonomy-Challenges from an Unfair Competition and
Human Rights Perspective, 3 INT'L J. PUB. L. POL'Y 1 (2013).
257. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 215, at 134-55.
258. VON HIPPEL, supra note 172, at 19-31.
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notion of process benefits, to the extent that consumers are engaging
in activities that are enjoyable in themselves.25 9
From the perspective of adherents to the output/profitability
test's intertype competition framework, such preferences are difficult
to explain. The output/profitability view deals only with observable
choices that explain consumers' preferences with regard to the
instrumental satisfactions obtained. Cars, clothes, television sets, or
books bought in the market offer opportunities for satisfaction
primarily in terms of how much they are worth on the commodity and
money markets. But aside from the ownership of brand reputation,
exclusiveness, origin, or configuration, it is the driving of the car, the
wearing of the clothes, the watching of a movie, or the reading of a
book that yield the intended satisfaction. The mental satisfactions
derived from these activities are distinct from merely purchasing a
good, and can be considered as the intrinsic process benefits attached
to their use in time.260
Support for this view emanates from far-reaching empirical
literature on the importance of procedural characteristics to an
individual's assessment of outcomes and the institutional structures
within which they exist. Psychologists have found repeatedly that
individuals value certain procedures not only for their influence over
outcomes, but also for their intrinsic desirability as fair procedures.
261
One of the most widely cited examples is the case that individuals are
far less likely to accept a price increase that they perceive to be
exploitative, such as the price increase for snow shovels after a
snowstorm or similar conditions pertaining to excess demand
situations.262  By the same token, if employees have been
extraordinarily dedicated, managers also will attempt to treat their
employees well, even when it is not in the manager's self-interest to do
so. 2 63  Other instances of economic behavior induced by fairness
considerations involve consumers who may not buy a good sold by a
259. F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford, Introduction and Overview to F. THOMAS
JUSTER, TIME, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING 1, 3-4 (F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford eds.,
1985); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 27-48
(2013).
260. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-7 (2006).
261. Id.; LIND & TYLER, supra note 259, at 1.
262. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986) [hereinafter
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Constraint on Profit Seeking]; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch
& Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285, 297-98 (1986)
[hereinafter Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Assumptions of Economics].
263. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 262, at 730;
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Assumptions of Economics, supra note 262, at 296.
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monopolist at unfair conditions even if the material value to the
consumer is greater than its price. The presence and extent of
procedural utility that consumers might obtain from taking part in a
marketplace that affords the right to "vote" through private
consumption on important matters of economic organization suggests
a conceptual scheme in which progress occupies an objective reality
capable of being described with regard to human values other than
those that the output/profitability view may capture. That is,
consumers participating in collaborative consumption may do so not
only because they are revealing their willingness to pay for the shared
good or for independent product innovations, but also because they are
attempting to express the strength of their conviction that such
production constitutes sound economic policy. 26 4 It is precisely the
difficulty of the output/profitability test to grapple with such
preferences that prevents it from adequately capturing the rich,
contextual manner in which real-world consumers conceive of
progress. As previously described, progress is to a large extent a
constructed concept that depends critically on the observer's prior
selection of relevant variables. Because consumer welfare is assessed
under the output/profitability test mostly in relation to quantifiable
factors that concern manufacturer output and price, the sphere of
relevant variables becomes confined to manifest (physical)
characteristics of goods and their proffered alternatives. In that
manner, the output/profitability test closely resembles the type of
consumer welfare assessment associated with expert decision-making.
D. Government-Regulated Preferences
Some authors have offered an equally critical examination of
the manner in which output/profitability analysis actually promotes
consumer interests. Even though the accepted account derives much
of its appeal from being a disciplined and administrable analytical tool
for evaluating market regulatory choices, these authors express
concern over the ability of market regulators and courts to presuppose
that the world outside official agencies is irrational, and that policy
choices made on any other basis than those founded on
output/profitability analyses must be fundamentally flawed. That is,
rather than engage in a meaningful comparison of the often more
distant and uncertain costs and benefits of innovation, factfinders are
forced to conceive of the costs and benefits of innovation in a manner
that is commensurable with the output/profitability framework.
264. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REV 525 (2004).
534 [Vol. XIX:3:473
ACCESS OVER OWNERSHIP
While the incorporation of such distinctions into the
conventional approach seems somewhat coarse, to some extent the
output/profitability framework is capable of incorporating the
observed disparities. Industrial organization economists have used
quality adjusted prices to help consumers value the benefits of
nonprice, quality related concerns indirectly, in light of empirical
evidence suggesting that individuals sometimes value variety, service,
independent maintenance and repair, and so on more than the
accidental benefits of increased manufacturer outputs that dominate
standard economic literature. For instance, markets that are price
competitive often are also valued as being competitive for nonprice
preferences. If accepted, this quality-adjusted price would work to
effectively translate consumers' nonprice preferences into price
equivalents by increasing the monetary benefits of such preferences
for purposes of conventional output/profitability analyses. But the
very promise of quality-adjusted nonprice attributes found in
industrial economic literature also suggests the literature's diversity,
indeterminacy, and potential manipulability. Just as industrial
economists are unable to agree among themselves whether specific
demands for innovation-related benefits are generally untrustworthy
or not, interest groups within regulatory battles seem likely to cast
about within antitrust and intellectual property law scholarship in
search of studies and findings that support their preferred outcomes.
As Douglas Melamed explains, there are serious problems with such
an approach.
First, it would be hard to apply and, indeed, would likely be beyond the competence
of the courts and enforcement agencies. Weighing the benefits to welfare ...
against the harm to welfare . . . would require quantifying both welfare effects by
estimating price, cost, and quantity of output under two conditions-before and
after [the innovation]; dealing with the time dimension (both duration and
discounting to present value) of each; and comparing both to a hypothetical but-for
world in which the [innovation] did not take place. Efforts to shortcut the process
by substituting intuition or educated guesses for precise calculation would reduce
transaction costs but also would move the analysis along a continuum from
probably impossible precision toward arbitrary decision.
26 5
It is apparent, then, that all relevant factors cannot always be
captured in the output/profitability calculus of quality adjusted price.
Franklin M. Fisher and Daniel L. Rubinfeld have rendered this
point plain in their economic analysis of United States v. Microsoft. As
they explain:
Microsoft made its bundling decision not to achieve efficiencies but to foreclose
competition. The problem is not that Microsoft offered OEMs [Original Equipment
265. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary
Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 381 (2006).
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Manufacturers] and users a bundled version of Windows and IE [Internet
Explorer]; it is that Microsoft did not give them the option of taking Windows
without the browser. It thus compelled those OEMs and users that wished
otherwise to take IE in order to get Windows. This foreclosure of competition had
an immediate harmful effect on consumers, whose choice of browsers was
restricted and who faced substantial uncertainty. The harm was not simply to
consumers who faced limited browser choice; other harms resulted from the
unnecessarily cumbersome operating system, and by the limited options of those
who preferred not to use a browser.266
Given the different types of harms involved, if price and output
are still taken as the sole means of measuring and balancing the costs
and benefits of some instance of anticompetitive practice, this
inevitably involves differentiated weighting of the subjective
valuations of the various types of consumer harms concerned. Such
differentiated weighting applies not only with respect to the producer-
consumer relationship but also to discrepancies between the subjective
valuations of consumers relative to other consumers. The regulator,
in such cases, faces a choice that can only be justified on normative
grounds. Should he attempt to use certain weighting factors to
compensate for a loss in consumer choice? And on what basis are the
said weighting factors to be defined? Whichever route is taken
determines the final result. But, depending on the option chosen, the
competitive assessment of a given case at hand will not always be the
same. Instead, this arrangement runs the risk of reducing the
output/profitability calculus to a decision rule subject to random
manipulation. Suddenly, it is no longer a matter of balancing
quantifiable factors; rather, it becomes a matter of economic policy
debate on the role of protecting businesses allegedly restrained from
competing or of protecting the businesses allegedly restraining
competitors that is played out under the guise of an equally-balanced
output/profitability analysis.
Attempts to incorporate non-price preferences into the
output/profitability test thus might simply add another layer of
gamesmanship to a regulatory process that already has been fittingly
described as blood sport.267  Consider Neil Averitt's and Robert
Lande's proposed "consumer choice" paradigm as an alternative to the
prevailing output/profitability test in antitrust law. According to
Averitt and Lande, "an antitrust violation can ... be understood as an
activity that unreasonably restricts the totality of price and nonprice
266. EvANs, FISHER, RUBINFELD & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 33, at 35-36, 57, 60-61.
267. Thomas 0. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly
Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2011).
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choices that would otherwise have been available [to consumers] ."268
According to their view, the central focus of US courts in a series of
recent rulemakings has not been on the price or cost of production of
any current product or service, but rather on the possibility that
innovation in the form of new products and increased consumer choice
will be diminished by an allegedly anticompetitive practice.269 One of
their examples includes Judge Jackson's definition of the relevant
market in Microsoft with respect to consumers' incapacity to
substitute other products for Microsoft's operating system. As
Jackson explained, "a consumer would not obtain a satisfactory
substitute for an Intel-compatible PC operating system even if
he purchased a server, since server operating systems lack the
features-and support for the breadth of applications-that induce
users to purchase Intel-compatible PC operating systems."27 0 On this
basis, Jackson defined Microsoft's market power in terms of consumer
preferences for various features: "[t]he consumer wants an operating
system that runs not only types of applications that he knows he will
want to use, but also those types in which he might develop an
interest later."271 With respect to the question of whether monopoly
power had illegally been maintained, Jackson found that "the actions
that Microsoft took against Navigator hobbled a form of innovation
that had shown the potential to depress the applications barrier to
entry sufficiently to enable other firms to compete effectively against
Microsoft in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.
That competition would have conduced to consumer choice and
nurtured innovation."272 Jackson's articulation of consumer harm
thereby rendered, contrary to what the accepted account permits,
consumer choice as the focal point of Microsoft's illegal maintenance of
market power.273
The primary justification for the protection of consumer choice
generally, notwithstanding low price in particular, comes from a
concern by scholars and practitioners that the output/profitability
approach often cannot accurately reflect the full range of consumer
concerns and preferences, and instead tends to impose artificial
restrictions on the range of nonprice options relevant to making
268. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 182 (2007).
269. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1997); Robert H.
Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2000).
270. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1999).
271. Id. at 19.
272. Id. at 111-12.
273. Id. at 50-51, 111-12.
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reasonably free and rational selections from those options.274
However, critics of this view respond that, just as the standard
economic literature more generally has been interpreted to suggest
that consumers often misconstrue and mis-pursue their best rational
interests, "the choice standard . . . altogether rejects the economic
approach to dealing with [conventional] trade-offs," 2 75 and thus
reduces what is conventionally understood by consumer and total
welfare "by shifting the focus of antitrust analysis from efficiency to
... misleading proxies for consumer welfare."276  In this way,
opponents of the choice approach to antitrust reject altogether
arguments that there are other, cognitively less visible dimensions of
competition and innovation apart from price, and that the tendency of
the choice standard is to distract from "key economic questions and to
avoid analysis of the relevant [issues]. "277 Consistent with these
assumptions is the associated conclusion that:
[C]onsumers' revealed preferences, as expressed in their actual choices, [do not
require antitrust analysis to ignore or under-weigh nonprice dimensions of
competition]. [Instead], the standard microeconomic framework requires the
assumption that consumer preferences are relatively stable, but those preferences
can and do incorporate various nonprice values. Therefore, to incorporate nonprice
elements into the standard model, as a conceptual matter, no revolution is
required.2 7 8
Any departure from the accepted account, as a result, is not just
unnecessary in this view, but mostly undesirable.279
E. Normative Preferences
Consumer preferences for new innovation should be understood
not only from the vantage point of their effect on the outside world or
their usefulness as instruments for civic communication, but also from
the standpoint that consumption frequently is a uniquely personal
activity with far-reaching ethical implications. As Richard Stallman,
the American software freedom activist and computer programmer
remarked, "'[c]ontrol over the use of one's ideas' really constitutes
control over other people's lives; and it is usually used to make their
274. Averitt & Lande, supra note 268, at 175; Lande, supra note 269, at 503.
275. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 2422.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2414.
278. Id. at 2417.
279. Id. at 2411 ("An evidence based approach to incorporating nonprice competition into
the traditional welfare standard ... would be unobjectionable.").
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lives more difficult." 280 Many consumers seem to share aspects of this
view, such that their own sense of moral well-being is affected by the
nature and degree of contractual or intellectual property rights that
others hold regardless of the effect that collaborative consumption, or
indeed their own behavior, may have on existing forms of production
and distribution. Like the procedural aspects of collaborative
consumption preferences, this ethical account provides an
independent ground for conceiving of such preferences as worthy of
respect by government agencies and courts. That is, even if observed
consumer choices do not justify support of preferences for promoting
innovation according to a regulator's technical or scientific
assessment, regulators still are obliged to recognize the intrinsically
private elements of the act of buying and consuming, and the widely
accepted liberal denial to dissect or evaluate such inward-looking
beliefs.281
For example, it is often said that private rights, particularly
intellectual property rights, are meant to "strike a balance" between
producers' and consumers' interests. They are supposed to do so not
for their own sake but rather to modify individual behavior, to provide
an incentive for innovators to create more, and for manufacturers to
produce to a greater extent. But as the normative view suggests-an
observation that proponents of the output/profitability view tend to
neglect-consumers also have an interest in their own freedom in
making further use of existing innovations. According to this view,
because producers' and consumers' interests often (partly) collide, we
cannot think of striking the right balance of interests between those
parties. Rather we must think of arriving at the right balance
between spending consumers' freedom and keeping it. More subtly,
we may compare this trade-off to an attempt by the government to
obtain for taxpaying motorists the best deal it can get when signing
contracts with construction companies to build highways. The
government, in such a case, will attempt to use the least possible
amount of the taxpayer's wealth (by, for instance engaging in
competitive bidding-making use of market forces, not monopolies-to
lower the price of offers). When the government acts on behalf of the
public, it is responsible for finding the best possible deal, that is, the
agreement that is best for the public, not best for the other party in
the agreement. These same principles apply in the context of
promoting innovation and progress. Here, the government spends
280. Richard Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 39 (Joshua Gay ed., 2009).
281. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1978); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 303-04 (1993).
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consumers' freedom (by granting property rights to market actors)
instead of their money. It is often said that freedom is more precious
than money, which is why the government's obligation to spend
consumers' freedom intelligently and carefully is even greater than its
obligation to spend their money in the same way.2 82
Other critics argue that consumer preferences for new
innovation do not reflect a normatively defensible vision of consumer
behavior when considered in light of the widely accepted goal of
antitrust and intellectual property law of maximizing producers'
output.2 8 3 The difficulty with this argument, from the vantage point of
consumers who value collaborative consumption, is that the goal of
maximizing, not just increasing, output elevates producers far above
consumers. When people buy something, they do not generally buy
the whole quantity in stock or always purchase the most expensive
version of an article. People often use their funds sparingly, by
purchasing only what they need of any particular good, and pick a
model of sufficient rather than the highest quality. The law of
diminishing returns implies that spending all our wealth on one
specific article constitutes an inefficient allocation of resources; people
thus usually decide to save some money for other expenditures.28 4
Diminishing returns apply to antitrust and intellectual property law
just as to any other purchase. If we try to find a reasonable way of
posing the ethical dilemmas created by a world of output
maximization, the first freedoms we should reasonably bargain away
are those that affect consumers the least, while encouraging
innovation the most.285 The maximization of producers' returns above
all else thus simply rejects many of the more profitable, perhaps wiser
bargains in advance, and commands consumers to give up virtually all
of their freedom to use the existing stock of raw material to encourage
private innovation for just a little more output.
282. See Richard Stallman, Misinterpreting Copyright-A Series of Errors, in FREE
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 81 (Joshua Gay ed.,
2009).
283. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2012); Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False) Choice Between Purchaser
Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2012); Barak Orbach, Antitrust's Pursuit
of Purpose, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151 (2012); Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 180, at 2409.
284. Stallman, supra note 282, at 82.
285. Id. (arguing that the goal of maximizing publication in the copyright context,
regardless of the cost to freedom, is supported by widespread rhetoric which asserts that public




Application of the market access doctrine must thus not consist
of the type of largely unguided, formless judgment that commentators
to date have associated with it. As findings from the cognitive
psychological research demonstrate, courts should be tasked with
determining as a factual matter, specifically the kind of progress
ordinary consumers value. Further, the analysis must take into
account the types of innovation that observers of collaborative forms of
consumption have identified as pertinent to public understanding and
beliefs about progress. Because uncompensated benefits that one
person's activity provides to another are ubiquitous in our society and
economy, antitrust and intellectual property law scholars must devise
rules that enable sharing, that is, provide access to an innovator's
production output which is a main force of promoting progress. More
broadly, rules based on antitrust and intellectual property laws must
reflect a view according to which free riding is not always a wrong in
and of itself, and that contractual and intellectual property rights
should not always strive to internalize all of the benefits generated by
the intellectual property for others.286  The larger challenge of
antitrust and intellectual property laws will thus be to make
meaningful distinctions between sheer quantitative expansion
(growth) from qualitative improvement (development) in order to
further not only the consumption of more (physical) goods over time,
but also, and perhaps primarily, to advance human prosperity in the
long-run.287 An effective market access test must therefore render
expert testimony admissible for those aspects of innovation that raise
issues relating to ordinary consumer perceptions.
The inclusion in antitrust and intellectual property law of the
insight that many everyday durable consumer goods may be
understood as "platforms" might work, quite reasonably, toward this
end. First, to moderate the appeal of the consumption of mere
"output," scholars, administrative agencies and courts must begin to
recognize that not only digital information goods, such as computer
applications and the like, constitute "platforms," but that most
durable consumer goods provide a basis for the delivery of further
286. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 684 (2007) (arguing that overexposure of works doesn't cause
congestion externalities but will often serve as additional advertising, and that higher demand of
the work will cause even higher demand in other consumers); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark
P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 140-41 (2010).
287. Amartya Sen, The Moral Standing of the Market, 2 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 1 (1985); see
also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV.L.REV. 621, 624-26, 677 (1998). ,
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content. In nearly all innovation markets, platforms rely on
complementary products or services that use the base good as a
standard or user interface. Take, for example, a Kodak printer. This
product, which can be understood as a platform, supports
complementary -goods and services specifically made for it.288
Similarly, both a razor and a razor blade, a television and a speaker
set, or a cell phone and a charger work in this fashion, as they enable
the use of complementary products in a compatible format. The
essence of each of these platforms is the platform standard-the base
good-for which complements can be built, and the user experience
generated by its enhancement.
Even though for market actors developing base goods that work
as platforms, protecting their platform standards is sometimes critical
to enabling them to succeed, such protection should not always
prevail. In the case of a printer, the manufacturer may well deny
(horizontal) access to its platform standard to preclude a would-be
rival from obtaining access to its system and appropriating the value
of the original invention by developing a clone. But (vertical) access,
which involves products and services that are complementary, not
substitutive, to the base good often should not be restricted. This
includes cases involving the ability to transfer user-created
innovations, such as the modification of bicycles or surfboards, from
one system to another.289 Furthermore, if it turns out that a single
platform emerges as dominant, antitrust and intellectual property
laws should make competition based on (as opposed to against) that
platform possible, by granting (horizontal) access on terms and
conditions that restrict the original manufacturer's ability to recoup
its investments to a reasonable extent (i.e., the smallest possible
extent necessary to provide sufficient incentives to innovate).290 In so
doing, antitrust and intellectual property laws will be adjusting
investment incentives (to prevent awarding excessive windfall profits
for existing innovations) and will facilitate sustained progress in
markets where a single market actor manages the basic platform
standard. In this manner, despite the longstanding complaint of
antitrust and intellectual property law scholars that market access
fails to provide a coherent and workable basis for antitrust and
intellectual property law liability, and despite the failure of courts
generally to articulate such a basis, the market access doctrine will
provide an important complement to the instrumentalist balancing of
output/profitability analysis.
288. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 222, at 285.
289. Id. at 281.




Antitrust and intellectual property law commentators rightly
have criticized the market access doctrine, despite its apparent
resistance to change. The aim of this Article has not been to defend
the doctrine as it currently is conceived and applied, but instead to
direct the way toward a more theoretically justifiable construction of
it, one that strives both to respond to the doctrine's critics and to
outline a substantively independent function for it to perform.
Particularly, if the proposed market access test were tied to concrete,
robust findings from the literature on various kinds of consumer
preferences, as this Article claims it should be, then the market access
doctrine would come to represent not a moment of unbridled intuition
on the part of judges, but an important vehicle for capturing ordinary
consumer judgments about new technologies, cumulative innovation,
and progress. Such judgments seem difficult to capture within
output/profitability approaches attempting to provide an answer to the
question of how consumer welfare can best be promoted. Accordingly,
the market access test defined and discussed in this Article should be
thought of as a work in progress, subject to debate and revision in the
best spirit of the framers of the Sherman Act and the Progress Clause.
Along those lines, future debate about the proposed market access test
should address potential objections to, and limitations of, the
reinvigorated market access doctrine.
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